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Letter from the editor 
he seventh issue of Workers of the World – International Journal on Strikes 
and Social Conflicts is a special issue built around the dossier “Labour 
Activism in the Middle East and North Africa”. The guest editor responsible 
for this issue is Peyman Jafari, a researcher who teaches global politics and 
Middle Eastern studies at the University of Amsterdam. 
Mohamed-Salah Omri revisits the Tunisian revolution of 2010-11 
and the ongoing transition with a view to investigate the role of local agency 
in radical change and protest movements over several decades. He argues 
that the Tunisian General Union of labour (UGTT) served as a focal point, 
not only for the working class but also for society as a whole, impacting the 
revolutionary process and the ensuing transitional period in significant 
ways. Claudie Fioroni analyses the rationale behind Jordan Phosphate 
Mines Company (JPMC) employees’ mobilisation within the context of the 
Arab popular uprisings. Derek Alan Ide explores the multifaceted dynamic 
that existed between the Egyptian Marxist movement and the Egyptian state 
under Gamal Abd al-Nasser, focusing heavily on the two periods of 
repression against the communist movement from 1952-1956 and from 
1959-1965. The issue is completed with a review article by Brecht de Smet 
of several books on the Egyptian revolution and the Arab uprising. 
 
Workers of the World is the journal of the International Association Strikes 
and Social Conflicts (http://www.iassc-mshdijon.fr/).  
Articles for Workers of the World should be sent to the executive editor at 
workersoftheworld2012@yahoo.co.uk. 
 
António Simões do Paço  
Executive Editor
T 
  
Introduction: Against all odds - labour activism in the Middle 
East and North Africa 
Peyman Jafari 
 
 
f class politics and labour activism in the West have been relegated to the 
margins of academic research and public debate in the last two decades, 
they have been almost entirely ignored when it comes to the analysis of the 
Middle East. Hence the awarding of the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize to 
Tunisia’s National Dialogue Quartet, in which the Tunisian General Labour 
Union (UGTT) is the leading force with over a half million members, is one 
of the rare moments the labour movement in the Middle East has received 
public recognition, albeit in a partial and distorted manner. As Joel Beinin, 
the eminent historian of labour in Egypt, recently commented, “most of the 
international media…followed the [Nobel Prize] committee’s lead in 
constructing a narrative that ignored the leading role of the UGTT in the 
Quartet and the intense social struggle that forced Ennhada from power.”1 
Moreover, the Nobel committee “sanitized” the Tunisian Revolution by 
stressing “peaceful dialogue” and “consensus-based solutions” and 
                                                 
1
 Ennahda is a moderate Islamist party that won the elections in October 2011 (37%), nine 
months after a revolutionary movement that had started in mid-December 2010 had ousted 
president Zine El-Abedine Ben Ali. After Ennahda formed a government, protests 
continued, including hundreds of strikes and occupations by UGTT. When two leftist 
political leaders were assassinated by a Salafist group in February and July 2013, the 
UGTT reacted with general strikes and demonstrations, pushing Ennahda towards 
compromise with the Quartet (formed in late August 2013). In January 2014 a new 
government was formed and a new constitution guaranteeing equal civil rights and 
acknowledging Islam as the country’s official religion was adopted. 
I 
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excluding the role of labour struggles in the form strikes, sit-inns, and 
occupations that fuelled the political transformations.
2
 
 Denial of the significance of labour activism and its “sanitization” 
have a long history, of course. The mode of knowledge production, in the 
West as well as in the Middle East, has played its part. In the West, 
Orientalist essentialism has reduced various social and political aspects of 
the Middle East to a particular understanding of Islam, obscuring the role of 
social class. In the Middle East, this approach has been introduced by 
colonial agents as well as self-Orientalizing intellectuals, but the major 
contributors to this trend have been the two most influential political 
projects of the twentieth century in the region, nationalist and Islamist 
populism.
3
 
 From the 1920s onwards, various nationalist populist leaders 
attempted, often in a post-colonial context, to craft a notion of “the people.” 
Writing about the Kemalists who laid the foundation of modern Turkey, 
Erik Zürcher notes “their denial of class struggle, their calling for national 
solidarity and their ruthless suppression of class-based organizations…”4 
The same could be said about the nationalism of Kemal Atatürk’s Iranian 
counterpart Reza Shah. Although less of a populist, he also cracked down 
on Iran’s growing labour movement in the 1920s and 1930s as part of his 
passive revolution aimed at industrializing the country from above.
5
 In the 
1960s and 1970s, his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, added populist rhetoric 
and institutions to his father’s nationalist modernization project, stressing 
the importance of workers’ contribution to the nation and attempting to 
incorporate them through yellow trade unions. 
 Similar processes were visible in the Arab countries, where varieties 
of nationalism combined industrialization and populism through corporatist 
arrangements, material concessions, and symbolic gestures to incorporate 
                                                 
2
 Beinin, Joel, “Sanitizing the Tunisian Revolution,” 12 October 2015, retrievable at 
http://stanfordpress.typepad.com/blog/2015/10/sanitizing-the-tunisian-
revolution.html#more 
3
 For interpretations of the main forms of Islamism (political Islam) as populism, see 
Abrahamian, Ervand, “Fundamentalism or Populism.” In Khomeinism: Essays on the 
Islamic Republic (Berkeley: University of California, 1993); Colás, Alejandro, “The Re-
invention of Populism: Islamist Responses to Capitalist Development in the Contemporary 
Maghreb,” Historical Materialism 12,4; Chris Harman, “The Prophet and the Proletariat,” 
International Socialism Journal 64, Autumn 1994; Jafari, Peyman “Rupture and Revolt in 
Iran,” International Socialism Journal 124, Autumn 2009. 
4
 Zürcher, Erik-Jan, “Ottoman Sources of Kemalist Thought.” In Elisabeth Özdalga (ed.), 
Late Ottoman Society: Intellectual Legacy. New York: Routledge, 2005. 
5
 Atabaki, Touraj and Zürcher, Erik-Jan (eds.), Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernization 
under Atatürk and Reza Shah. London: I.B. Tauris, 2004. 
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workers and other subaltern groups in grand state-building projects. In the 
early 20
th
 century, most workers were working as servants or were occupied 
in small shops, weaving cotton or carpets, spinning wool, reeling silk, or 
making shoes, but the emergence of railways and other modern transport 
systems (Suez Canal), ports (Alexandria, Izmir, Abadan), telegraph and 
telephone lines and an increasing number of manufacturing plants (textile), 
mines and oil facilities increased the number of workers.
6
 The first decades 
of the 20
th
 century also witnessed the emergence of mass urban politics, in 
which workers had an active part. Their struggles, often directed against the 
colonial structures, inspired the urban educated elite to approach workers as 
potential members of a modern nation, if they were provided proper 
education.  
 The first significant strikes appeared in this period, for instance 
between 1908 and 1910 in Egypt by tramway workers and railway 
workshop workers
7
 and the first modern trade unions were organized, for 
instance the Anatolian Railway workers’ union and Tehran’s print shop 
workers union, both established in 1907. Nationalist intellectuals and 
political leaders welcomed these struggles, as they provided ammunition 
against foreign powers, for instance during the Arab Revolt of 1936-38 in 
Palestine.
8
 Although liberal nationalism had a great influence on these 
movements, particularly in Egypt through the Nationalist Party in the 1910s 
and the Wafd Party in the 1920s and 1930s,
9
 social radicalism had a 
significant presence as well. Thus many strikes were not only targeting 
foreign domination, but also domestic tyranny and social injustices, and 
socialists and communists were at the heart of the emerging workers’ 
organizations.  
 Many of the trade unions were initiated by communist workers and 
intellectuals, and their influence increased following the Russian 
Revolution. In the late 1920s, for instance, the communist activist Yusuf 
                                                 
6
 See for instance Quataert, Donald, Manufacturing in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, 
1500-1950. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994; Quataert, Donald and 
Zürcher, Erik-Jan (eds.), Workers and the Working Class in the Ottoman Empire and the 
Turkish Republic. London: I.B. Tauris, 1995. 
7
 Beinin, Joel and Lockman, Zachary, Workers on the Nile: Nationalism, Communism, 
Islam and the Eyptian Working Class, 1882-1954. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1987. 
8
 For a discussion of labour activism in historic Palestine and the attempts to create unity 
among Jewish and Arab workers see Lockman, Zachary, Comrades and Enemies: Arab and 
Jewish Workers in Palestine, 1906-1948. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of 
California Press, 1996. 
9
 Beinin, Joel, Workers and Peasants in the Modern Middle East. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001, pp. 75-90. 
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Eftekhari helped to form a number of underground cells among the 11,000 
oil workers of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in Abadan. Despite arrests 
and repression, oil workers protested on May Day 1929 demanding higher 
wages, shorter hours, and recognition of their trade union. A general strike 
on 4 May was repressed, but as Stephanie Cronin has argued, it signified the 
arrival of a new social force in Iranian politics, demonstrating the potency of 
a new type of protest, the industrial strike.
10
 Strikes like this linked social 
demands to nationalist aspirations of independence and development. 
Another important aspect of these strikes was their potential to transcend 
ethnic divisions and unite workers around social and anti-imperialist 
demands. Writing on the historiography of labour in Iraq, Eric Davis 
observes, “In none of the strikes and worker demonstrations that I have 
examined did ethnolinguistic or confessional differences play any 
significant role dividing worker loyalties. Indeed, Western diplomatic 
records, largely of worker demands, underline the tremendous amount of 
worker solidarity throughout strikes and demonstrations despite the use of 
armed force to bring them to an end.”11 Examples of other strikes, such as 
the 1946 oil strike in Abadan that was marked by ethnic tensions – 
instigated by the British authorities – between Arabs and the communist led 
union, show class solidarity not always won the day, but it was a significant 
force nevertheless.
12
  
 By weakening and distracting the colonial powers, the Second World 
War created the conditions in which labour radicalism increased in the 
1940s and 1950s as the following examples demonstrate: the Shubra al-
Khayma textile workers’ strikes in 1946 and 1951-52, the 1951 strike of the 
71,000 Egyptian workers employed by the British in the Suez Canal Zone, 
the first industrial strike in Bahrain in the Bahrain Petroleum Company 
(BAPCO) in December 1943 followed by the formation of the General 
Trade Union a decade later, oil workers’ strikes in Iran in 1946, the 
legalization of twelve of the sixteen trade unions in Iraq in 1944-46 
followed by strikes of Iraqi rail workers in 1945 at Schalchiyya railway 
workshops, oil workers’ strike in Kirkuk in 1946 and at the K3 pumping 
                                                 
10
 Cronin, Stephanie, “Popular Politics, the New State and the Birth of the Iranian Working 
Class: The 1929 Abadan Oil Refinery Strike,” Middle Eastern Studies 46,5, 2010, pp. 699-
732. 
11
 Davis, Eric, “History for the Many or History for the Few? The Historiography of the 
Iraqi Working Class.” In Working and Working Classes in the Middle East: Struggles, 
Histories, Historiographies. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994, p. 291. 
12
 On the 1946 Abadan strike see Abrahamian, Ervand, Iran Between Two Revolutions. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982, pp. 361-62. 
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station near Haditha in April 1948, and the formation of the Aden Trades 
Union Congress in 1956 in South Yemen.
13
 
 The rise of nationalist populism in the 1950s and 1960s in the 
Middle East was the continuation of the anti-colonial struggles of the 
previous decades as members of the new middle class, often in military 
uniforms, attempted to realize national independence through post-colonial 
state-building. Nationalist populism, however, was also in a way the 
recognition of the power of the working class and at the same time an 
attempt to neutralize its social radicalism by denying working class 
subjectivity and instead promoting the notion of the “people.”14 Inspired by 
the Soviet Union’s the state capitalist path to industrialization, nationalist 
populist leaders combined anti-imperialism with state-led industrialization 
and social reforms that aligned workers and landless peasants with the state 
bureaucracy.  
 These political projects, referred to as “Arab socialism,” became 
manifest in Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser, in Syria under Ba‘thist rule 
after 1963, in Iraq under the Free Officers following their military 
overthrow of the monarchy in 1958 and then the Ba‘thist rule after 1968. 
Post-colonial, nationalist, authoritarian populist regimes were also 
established in Tunisia and Algeria, although in weaker forms, and even the 
Shah of Iran was developing his own populist style in the 1960s through 
what he called the “Revolution of the Shah and the People” (White 
Revolution). While banning independent trade unions, these regimes 
promised to further the cause of workers through the strategy of import-
substitution. The incorporation of trade unions could go very far, as in 
Tunisia where Ahmad Ben Salah, the main union secretary general, became 
minister of economy in 1961 and “advocated imposing austerity in order to 
build socialism.”15 In Egypt, labour activism resurfaced in the early 1970s 
following Nasser’s death, but the trade union leader’s loyalty to the state 
maintained the corporatist break on strikes under al-Sadat. In Iran, strikes 
and other labour protests decreased following the crack down on the labour 
movement and the Left after the 1953 coup d’état against the nationalist 
                                                 
13
 On Egyptian workers’ protests in this period, see Beinin and Lockman, Workers on the 
Nile, pp. 285-363. On the 1946 Abadan strike see Atabaki, Touraj, “Chronicle of a Strike 
Foretold: Abadan, July 1946” (forthcoming); On Iraq’s oil strikes see Batatu, Hanna, The 
Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq’s Old 
Landed and Commercial Classes and of Its Communists, Ba‘thists, and Free Officers. 
London: Saqi Books, 2004 [1978], pp.622-27. 
14
 Peasant revolts in a number of countries, most importantly Egypt and Syria, had the same 
effect. 
15
 Joel Beinin, Workers and Peasants in the Modern Middle East, p.137. 
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Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq, and during the economic growth 
and the social reforms of the 1960s. The only country going against the 
grain was Turkey. As Ronnie Margulies and Ergin Yildizoğlu write, “The 
1960s witnessed the transformation of a young and inexperienced working 
class into a very militant and highly organized sector. The number of 
unionized workers increased in leaps and bounds, reaching the one-million 
mark at the end of the decade. Strikes involved larger numbers of workers 
and were more prolonged, particularly in the late 1960s and throughout the 
1970s.”16 
 The nationalist populist regime’s subordination of independent 
labour movements in this period didn’t meet any significant resistance from 
the Stalinist parties that due to their two-stages theory conceived these 
regimes as the first necessary stage and deferred socialist class struggle to 
later. By the 1970s, however, these regimes were stagnating or falling into 
crisis due to the limitations of import-substitution development. The demise 
of secular nationalist populism and communism opened up a bigger space 
for the growth of Islamist movements that had emerged in the late 19
th
 and 
early 20
th
 century mainly as reactions to imperialism. Just as the nationalist 
populist movements, Islamist were forced to recognised the significance of 
the working class, but they too tried to subordinate the labour movement 
and neutralize its radicalism by denying its autonomy and subsuming it 
under the Islamic “ummah.” 
 In Egypt, for instance, Muslim Brothers were involved in the 
formation of the Shubra al-Khayma Mechanized Textile Workers’ Union in 
the late 1930s. In the 1940s they started to pay more attention to social 
issues and established the Workers’ Section of the Society of Muslim 
Brothers to exert more direct influence in the workers’ movement.17 While 
promising to establish social justice and improve workers’ living standards, 
the Muslim Brothers denied class-based politics. Ayatollah Khomeini, who 
stood at the head of the Islamist current in the Iranian Revolution and 
founded the Islamic Republic, explicitly adopted a class-struggle and social 
justice vocabulary, using terms such as “mostazafan”, the downtrodden, to 
refer to a mixed group that included not only the poor and workers, but also 
pious merchants. But in Khomeini’s Islamist populism that shaped the state-
society relations in the 1980s in Iran, workers were praised and promised 
benefits, but they were denied the right to organize independently. The 
                                                 
16
 Margulies, Ronnie and Yildizoğlu, Ergin, “Trade Unions and Turkey’s Working Class,” 
Merip Reports 121, February 1984, pp.15-31. 
17
 Beinin and Lockman, Workers on the Nile, pp.363-394. 
12 Introduction: labour activism in the Middle East and North Africa 
 
 
similarity with nationalist populist approach to labour activism doesn’t stop 
here. The Islamic Republic of Iran were trying to follow the path of import-
substitution and state-led development, before introducing liberalization 
policies from the 1990s onwards, and marginalizing even the recognized 
labour organizations. 
 
From neoliberalism to the Arab Revolutions 
If nationalist and Islamist narratives obscured the importance of 
labour activism, the rise of neoliberalism since the 1980s has tried to 
obliterate the labour movement socially, organizationally and discursively. 
The infitah policies adopted in Egypt in 1974 signalled the introduction of 
privatization and liberalization in all most all Middle Easter countries in the 
following two decades; in Tunisia and Morocco in the late 1970s as the 
government enthusiastically adopted the “structural adjustment 
programmes” of the IMF and the World Bank, in Turkey after the military 
coup in 1980, and in Iran from the early 1990s onwards. These policies that 
unravelled the populist arrangements and undermined the position of even 
the yellow trade unions were met by labour protests, which were 
subsequently represses. 
 At the same time, the developments of the previous decades had 
started to reconfigure the working class. Most importantly, rapid 
urbanization expanded the shantytowns and the numbers of people working 
in the “informal sector” as unemployment, underemployment, precarious 
labour relations, and unpaid labour increased. These workers lacked the 
experience of collective organization and rarely joined trade unions. This 
reconfiguration was also prompted by the expansion of the service sector 
and the stagnation of the industries, which led to a slight increase of female 
labour. The possibility of labour migration, induced by the oil-boom after 
1973, formed another obstacle to labour activism. In the mid-1980s, there 
were over 5 million migrant Arab workers in the Persian Gulf countries and 
some 2.5 million North Africans were employed in Europe.
18
 
 As neoliberalism marched on in the 1990s and 2000s, class politics 
became out of vogue and the importance of labour activism was widely 
denied. Labour unions were at best seen as civil society organizations that 
should promote workers’ rights within the free market. The Arab 
Revolutions of 2011, however, have brought labour activism back into the 
                                                 
18
 Beinin, Workers and Peasants in the Modern Middle East, p. 151. 
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spotlights, not only due to important role they played in the Egyptian and 
Tunisian revolutions, but also due to a broader return of the “social 
question” that has preceded these revolutions. One can for instance point to 
the revival of labour activism in Iran since the early 2000s, and the 
increasing attention for the plight of migrant workers in the Persian Gulf 
countries and the deepening of social inequalities globally and in the Middle 
East.
19
 
 The Arab Revolutions have stimulated a number of new publications 
on labour activism in the Middle East. In the opening article of this special 
issue of Workers of the World, Brecht de Smet reviews a number of 
publications centred around the issues of social class and labour activism in 
the Middle East, reflecting on the revolutions that swept the region in 2011. 
In his timely article on the Tunisian General Union of Labour, Mohamed-
Salah Omri counters the assumption that “the Arab world was incapable of 
producing agency, which is neither military tribal, factional, or in the form 
of exceptional individuals whether secular or religious,” and sets out to 
explain the relatively successful course of the Tunisian revolution, which he 
partly contributes to the significant role played by the trade union.  
 Labour activism, of course, most often comes in small acts and non-
revolutionary situations. In an ethnographic study of the Jordan Phosphate 
Mines Company, Claudie Fioronie explores the motivations behind 
workers’ protests, tracing their roots to their everyday experience in the 
workplace. Finally, Derek Alan Ide provides a more historical perspective, 
looking at two episodes of repression of communist workers and party 
members under Nasser’s nationalist populism, highlighting the problematic 
relationship that existed between Nasserism and communism in Egypt.  
 Together, these articles remind us that labour activism has played 
and continues to play an important role in the Middle East and North Africa 
and that it provides the best hope to challenge neoliberalism, foreign 
domination and ethno-religious sectarianism. 
 
 
                                                 
19
 On Iran, see Andreas, Malm and Esmailian, Shora, Iran on the Brink: Rising Workers 
and Threats of War (London, Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto, 2007); Moghissi, Haideh and 
Rahnema, Saeed, “The Working Class and the Islamic State in Iran,” in Socialist Register 
2011, pp.197-218; Sina Moradi, Labour Activism and Democracy in Iran. Knowledge 
Programme Civil Society in West Asia. Working Paper 22. The Hague: Hivos, 2013. 
 No Ordinary Union: UGTT and the Tunisian path to 
revolution and transition 
Mohamed-Salah Omri 
 
 
aking initial stock of the “Arab Spring” early in 2011, Michael Hudson 
enumerated five cases of “conventional wisdom” about Arab and Middle 
East politics before the uprisings: authoritarianism in the region is durable; 
democratization is an inappropriate goal and is impossible to reach in the 
Arab world; populations are passive either due to rentier state policies or 
coercion; Arab nationalism is dead; the Middle East regional system is 
essentially stable.
1
 These assumptions, Hudson suggests, have led analysts 
and academics to focus on the system as such and on the state, with the 
consequence that “the strength and durability of protest movements” were 
ignored.
2
 This could be due to “group-think, theoretical tunnel vision, 
ideological agendas, insufficient attention to the work of Arab intellectuals, 
and a lack of multidisciplinary approaches”.3 In addition, one could even 
speak of de facto, and often willing, academic and media collusion with 
authoritarian regimes in the region and with their supporters abroad.
4
 Pascal 
Boniface goes even further and talks about forgery in his book, Les 
                                                 
1
 HUDSON, Michael. "Awakening, cataclysm, or just a series of events? Reflections on the 
current wave of protest in the Arab World” in BSHEER, Rosie and ABU-RISH, Ziad 
(eds.). The Dawn of the Arab Uprisings: end of an order? London: Pluto, 2012, pp. 26-27. 
His comments were first published on 16 May 2011. 
2
 Ibid., p. 27. 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 See OMRI, Mohamed-Salah. “Arab and Islamic Studies in the Context of the ‘War on 
Terror’ in Britain and the United States” in TEMIMI, Abdeljalil (ed.). Al-jami’at wa la-
bahithun al-arab: bayna al-hurriya wa mumarasat al-raqabah [Universities and Arab 
researchers: between freedom and the practices of censorship], Tunis: FTRSI, 2011, pp. 79-
98 (in Arabic). See also the comprehensive sociological study: GUESSOUMI, Mouldi. 
Mujtama’ al-Thawra [The Society of the Revolution] Tunis: Faculty of Letters, 2015.  
T 
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intellectuels faussaires: le triomphe médiatique des experts en mensonge, 
which analyses the French scene. He shows the bias and the implications of 
such expertise: “These intellectuals have explained to us how backwardness, 
which they consider germane to these societies, made them immune to 
democracy, which justifies the recourse to war to free these peoples from 
their dictators”.5 
 
Mohamed Ali Square, where the headquarters of UGTT are located. This iconic square in 
the heart of Tunis, named after the founder of the first union in 1924, has served for 
decades as a focal point for demonstrations, sit-ins, hunger strikes and assemblies. The 
square is decorated with the flags of the union and the country and the pictures of the 
founding fathers of unionism in Tunisia. 
 
In my view, the lack of attention to local intellectuals underlies a 
wider point, namely, an assumption that local organized agency is absent 
from the region, or that agency is limited to political parties or the military. 
The underlying premise is that the Arab world was incapable of producing 
agency, which is not military, tribal, factional, or in the form of exceptional 
individuals, whether secular or religious, hence the academic and media 
attention given to issues of identity politics, radicalism, terrorism and 
                                                 
5
 BONIFACE, Pascal. Les intellectuels faussaires: le triomphe médiatique des experts en 
mensonge. Paris: Jean-Claude Gawsewith, 2011, p. 83 (my translation).  
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political Islam in general. Moreover, it betrays a widely held assumption 
that Arabs have not produced reflection and analysis or knowledge on their 
societies, which are worthy of consideration. They are considered known or 
knowable rather than producers of knowledge. Yet, it is striking how local 
academics have had a very different view of the events.
6
 And much of the 
current essay is in fact based on local analysis and sources, mostly written in 
Arabic, and on interviews of key figures in Tunisia.
7
 
A number of mysteries and question marks surround the Arab 
Uprisings in general and the Tunisian revolution and its outcome, or the so-
called “Tunisian exception”, in particular. Before 2011, Tunisia was in fact 
the rule rather than the exception in the thinking outlined above in a number 
of ways: stable, growing steadily, homogeneous, functioning well, and a hot 
tourism destination. What made Tunisians rise up? Why was the Tunisian 
path to transition different from Egypt, Syria, Libya and Yemen? Why has it 
been hailed as a “success story”? Would it not be more appropriate to ask: a 
success story for whom? For the march of the market economy and liberal 
democracy – hence the immense interest from the United States in 
particular? For the revolting masses? For political Islam? Only a nuanced, 
well-informed analysis of pre-2011 society and its politics would provide a 
proper understanding of the revolution and its aftermath.  
In a paper titled, “Why the Tunisian path was singular and why does 
it matter”, I argued for a number of factors which could account for this 
singularity: the movement of protest was from country to city, the role of 
                                                 
6
 See, for example, the special issue of boundary 2 where Tunisian scholars and activists 
assess the revolution in their country: http://boundary2.dukejournals.org/content/ 
39/1.toc.pdf 
7
 These local sources include: Temimi’s numerous works, most notably marsad al-thawra 
al-tunisiyya [Observatory of the Tunisian Revolution] in 3 volumes (1500 pages); 
TIMOUMI, Hedi. Khud’at al-istibdad al-na’im fi tunis; 23 sanah min hukm bin Ali [The 
Deception of Soft Dictatorship in Tunisia: 23 years of Ben Ali’s rule] Tunis: Dar Mohamed 
Ali, 2012. For the events themselves and chronologies, see, for example: WESLATI, Salah. 
Democracie ou guerre civile. Tunis, Nirvana, 2012. This book chronicles in detail 90 days 
(January 14- March 14, 2011), with background to the 2011 revolution. Part of the relevant 
archive of UGTT is still at the Ministry of the Interior because of police raids during 
various occasions in the confrontational relationship with the state. Some of the archive 
may never be recovered because it has been either lost during raids by the secret police or 
destroyed in the chaotic weeks after January 2011. I also interviewed Sami Tahri, the 
director of al-Sha’b newspaper and spokesperson of the UGTT, 17 April 2014 at Al-Sha’ab 
newspaper. Some ideas in the present paper have been published in my previous articles, 
see in particular: Trade unions and the construction of a specifically Tunisian protest 
configuration. OpenDemocracy, 13 September 2013. Retrievable at 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/mohamed-salah-omri/trade-unions-and-construction-of-
specifically-tunisian-protest-configuration; This is not a jasmine revolution. Transnational 
Institute, January 2011. Retrievable at http://www.tni.org/article/tunisia-revolution-dignity-
and-freedom-can-not-be-colour-coded 
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the military was limited and the labor movement was strong.
8
 Unlike the 
Egyptian revolution, which was mostly urban, in Tunisia one can speak of a 
rural revolution. It started in the interior and moved towards the Northern 
cities, prompting local historians to talk about the invasion of the city by the 
country in a recall of the 1864 revolts.
9
 By rural, however, I mean towns 
located in rural areas, with a mainly agricultural economy but which have, 
due to the specificities of nation building in Tunisia and compulsory and 
universal education, the same problems as well as similar structures of 
resistance as big cities. Along with these reasons, there was the well-known 
story of an early activation of social media, particularly in terms of 
circulating information. Mobile telephone became the main medium, 
reversing the regime’s success in cutting off and isolating the 2008 rebellion 
in Gafsa from public view. Social media enhanced the speed and extent of 
information circulation within the country at first, and then to a wider 
audience. As a result of this, by January 14, most world media, including al-
Jazeera, France 24 and even the BBC had already been to and reported on 
the killings in Kasserine, Regueb, Thala and elsewhere in the interior, which 
took place January 8-10.
10
 The participation of women and lawyers, an 
important and historically active body of resistance in Tunisia, led the way 
in many parts of the country, and articulated – and even raised – the 
demands of the people to a more political level. Much of this is well known. 
What is less known is that activists in The Tunisian General Union of 
Labour, better known by its French acronym, UGTT (Union Générale 
Tunisienne du Travail), Tunisia’s main trade union organization, played a 
                                                 
8
 OMRI, Mohamed-Salah. “In What Ways is the Path of the Tunisian Revolution Singular? 
And Why Does this Matter?” Paper presented at the conference “The Arab Springs: How 
do we understand the popular movements and political changes in the Middle East” at 
Sophia University and The Japan Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, 29-30 
January 2012. The army is a key element in any argument about the Tunisian path since, 
unlike elsewhere in the Arab world, it was never in government and was never powerful 
politically. Its role, to be neutral and even protective of the revolution, proved to be a key 
factor in the way things turned out. 
9
 JDEY, Ahmed. « Pour une histoire de la Tunisie du 14 Janvier 2011: la fin d’un dictateur 
et l’amorce de la construction démocratique » in La Tunisie du XXIème siècle: quel pouvoir 
pour quels modèles de société. EurOrient, no. 38, 2012.  
10
 Jeremy Bowen, the BBC Middle East Correspondent at the time, notes in fact how 
complacent and inattentive major media outlets had been to Tunisia specifically because of 
the success of the image promoted by the Tunisian state and the uncritical acceptance of it 
around the world. He says: “I realized the significance of what was happening in Tunisia 
only when I was prompted by an email from a Tunisian academic at Oxford University in 
early January asking why the BBC was not taking the uprising seriously.” BOWEN, 
Jeremy. The Arab Uprisings: the People want the fall of the system. London, New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 2012, p. 38.  
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leading role in spreading information and participating in the early 
responses to the Bouazizi self-immolation.
11
 
All these elements taken together have been determining factors in 
the revolutionary process. In addition, the elements of the transition were, in 
my view, embedded in the dynamics of the revolution itself. This is in 
contrast with Egypt where such demands and thinking about a post-
revolution transition were, in a way, controlled, not by the protesters or civil 
society, but by the army. In the present essay, I would like to zero in on 
what might be called the labour union factor, which is truly an exception, 
but was overlooked by Tunisia observers until recently.  
Tunisia has an organized labor movement that is unique in its history 
and social dimension. The UGTT, I argue, has been the most influential 
structured and structuring force of resistance and social contention in 
independent Tunisia. And while social contention in the country has been 
neither the most vigorous nor the most radical in the region (Algeria has far 
more riots for social demands than Tunisia and several other Arab countries 
– Yemen, Libya, Sudan - have had more radical movements in recent 
history), the organized labor movement sets the country apart and explains 
much of the way things have unfolded in 2011 and since.
12
 In other places, I 
develop an argument for the intersections between the labor movement and 
the culture of dissent as whole.
13
 Here, I pursue the argument by revisiting 
the history and the dynamics before and after 2011, with a view to this 
character and role of UGTT, that is, as a structured and structuring force, 
noting as well the ways in which such a force may have contributed to 
curtailing revolutionary ambition. In light of the regressions registered in the 
revolution, for a complex set of reasons which range from the rise of 
identity politics to violence, foreign intervention and the weakness of the 
alternative parties, I ask: in what ways and to what extent has the weight of 
UGTT or what I call the Tunisian unionist ceiling of ambition, contributed 
                                                 
11
 Bowen notes that the first information on the self-immolation was passed to the 
international media by local UGTT activists, who also organized the first demonstration to 
protest it the next day. Ibid., p. 38.  
12
 For a view of the role of workers and unions in the Egyptian revolution, see, 
ALEXANDER, Anne and BASSIOUNY, Mostafa. Bread, Freedom and Social Justice: 
workers and the Egyptian revolution. London: Zed Books, 2015. 
13
 OMRI, Mohamed-Salah. “Intersections between the Labour Movement and the Culture 
of Protest in Tunisia” in Bread, freedom and social justice. Cambridge, UK: University of 
Cambridge, CRASH, July 11-12, 2014. 
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to taming or regulating the revolutionary process? In other words, was the 
revolutionary process structured as (at?) the image of the UGTT in a way?
14
 
 
From incubator of protest and refuge for dissent to powerbroker 
Trade unionism in Tunisia goes back to the early twentieth century 
and has had both local and international aspirations since its inception by 
Mohamed Ali al Hammi (1890-1928), founder of the General Federation of 
Tunisian Workers in 1924.
15
 But it was with the charismatic and visionary 
Farhat Hached (1914-1952) that a home-grown strong organization would 
emerge. Hached learned union activism and community organizing within 
the French CGT for 15 years before splitting from it to start UGTT in 
1946.
16
 His union quickly gained support, clout and international ties, which 
it mobilized in order to pressure the French for more social and political 
rights for Tunisia, and to consolidate the union’s position as a key 
component of the national liberation movement. And it is specifically 
because of its birth in the midst of the struggle against French colonialism 
that the union had political involvement from the start, a line it has 
maintained throughout its history and guarded vigorously since. The unions’ 
charter reflects this orientation. Its aims include: “building a socialist and 
nationalist economy, independent and free from all forms of dependency; 
calling for fair distribution of national wealth in a way which guarantees the 
aspirations of all workers and lower sections of society; defending 
                                                 
14
 The legalization of the revolutionary process led by the Ben Ashour committee, which 
would result in the National Constituent Assembly, was sponsored and protected by UGTT. 
The spelling of all Tunisian names of people and places follows French convention. For 
example, the name of the founding member of UGTT is normally transliterated in English 
as Farhat Hashad, but is kept as Farhat Hached. The essay is dedicated to “al-Ittihad”.  
15
 Mohamed Ali Al-Hammi was self-educated, travelled extensively, including spending 
some time in Germany where he studied political economy. Upon his return, he called for 
the establishment of workers’ cooperatives across the country. The details of the founding 
were recorded by al-Hammi’s friend and collaborator, Tahar al-Haddad in his book al-
Ummal al-Tunisiyun wa dhuhur al-harakah al-naqabiyyah [ The Tunisian workers and the 
rise of labor unionism] (1927). Tunis: Dar Bouslama, 1987. 
16
 A sizeable number of studies document and analyse Farhat Hached’s legacy. See 
MANSOURI, Salim. Risalat al-Ittihad al-Am al-Tunisi li al-Shughl, 1946-1956 [The 
Mission of the Tunisian General Union of labour: 1946-1956. Tunis: Dar Mohamed Ali, 
2013. This publication gathers the editorials of the newspaper Sawt al Amal written by 
Hached from 1947 and 48 and by Ahmad Ben Salah in 1955 and 1956; MOKNI, 
Abdelwahid. Farhat Hached: al-mu’assis al-shahid wa al-qa’id al-shahid [Farhat Hashed: 
The founding witness and the martyred leader]: (Tunis: Samid, 2012). This publication 
makes extensive use of Hashad’s speeches. See also BEN HMIDA, Abdessalam. al-
harakah al-naqabiya al-wataniyya li al-shighghila al-tunisiya, 1924 to 1956 [The 
Nationalist labour movement of the Tunisian working class], vol. 1. Tunis: Dar Muhammad 
Ali, 1984. 
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individual and public liberties, and reinforcing democracy and human 
rights; supporting all people struggling to reclaim their sovereignty and 
determine their destiny and standing in solidarity with national liberation 
movements across the world”.17  
These aims were articulated, among others, in Hached’s address to 
workers on 16 May 1947, to mark the Bardo agreement of 1881, which 
surrendered the country to French rule. He says: “the workers’ struggle to 
improve their material and moral conditions is then tightly linked to the 
higher interests of the country, because such improvement requires a social 
change which cannot be obtained as long as the nation is subjected to the 
colonial system”.18 There are global resonances to this strategy, as he 
explains: “If union movements in free nations fight big capitalism and the 
governments which support it, it is incumbent upon the workers of 
colonized nations to combat that system which is really the exploitation of 
an entire people for the benefit of foreign capitalism”.19  
With such early credibility and closeness to the interests of the wider 
population, UGTT has enjoyed continuity in history and presence across the 
country, which paralleled and rivaled the ruling party at the height of its 
power under President Bourguiba and his successor Ben Ali, that is, from 
1956 to 2011. With 150 offices across the country, an office in every 
governorate and district, and over 680,000 current members, it has 
constituted a credible alternative to this party’s power and a locus of 
resistance to it, so much so that to be a unionist became a euphemism for 
being an opponent or an activist against the ruling party.
20
 This geographical 
reach and popular presence carved out a breathing space and provided 
institutional structuring for dissent. And it is in this sense that one can argue 
that UGTT has been the outcome of Tunisian protest and resistance 
movements and their incubator at the same time.  
                                                 
17
 UGTT. Al-Nidham al-dakhili [Internal Regulations]. Tunis: UGTT, 2007. One of the 
main tools in defending these goals is the right to strike. The Charter states: “The strike is a 
legitimate right in union struggle and is part and parcel of union rights included in the 
constitution (p. 100). The new Tunisian constitution stresses this point in article 36, stating 
that union rights, including the right to strike are guaranteed. See Dustur al-jumhuriyyah al-
tunisiyyah [The Constitution of the Republic of Tunisia]. Tunis: Official Press, 2014. 
18
 MANSOURI. Risalat al-Ittihad al-Am al-Tunisi li al-Shughl, 1946-1956. Op.Cit., p. 81. 
Hached also stresses, in the second newspaper of UGTT, sawt al-‘amal [Voice of labour], 
that while the union does not intervene in party politics, it assumes its responsibility in 
matters of public concern. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 From 1956 until 2011, the ruling Neo-Destour party and its successor, RCD, dominated 
completely political life in the country with a structure which penetrated even the smallest 
of towns and lowest sections of society. The party became synonymous with the state.  
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For example, in 1984 the union aligned itself with the rioting people 
during the bread revolt; in 2008, it was the main catalyst for the 
disobedience movement in the Mining Basin of Gafsa; and, on December 
2010, the UGTT, particularly its teachers’ unions and local offices across 
the country, became the headquarters of revolt against Ben Ali. The fit 
between the revolution and UGTT was almost natural since the main 
demands of the rising masses, namely jobs, national dignity and freedom, 
had been on the agenda of the union all along. The union was also very well 
represented in the remote hinterland, such as in Sidi Bouzid and Kasserine 
where the revolution began. Events, which started as spontaneous, were 
soon framed by local trade unions. This became a strategy by which 
sectorial strikes, particularly by teachers, soon turned into regional general 
strikes, starting from the South and moving northwards. An extremely 
important one was that of Sfax on 13 June 2011 where the largest 
demonstration until then was organized and articulated political claims, 
peacefully, in front of the UGTT local office. The culmination of such series 
of protests was the 14 January strike in Tunis at which point the head of the 
regime collapsed.  
For these reasons, successive governments tried to compromise with, 
co-opt, repress or change the character of the union, depending on the 
situation and the balance of power at hand at any given moment. In 1978, 
UGTT went on general strike to protest what amounted to a coup 
perpetrated by the Bourguiba government to change a union leadership 
judged to be too oppositional and too powerful. The cost was the worst 
setback in the union’s history since the assassination of its founder in 1952. 
The entire leadership of the union was put on trial and replaced by regime 
loyalists. Ensuing popular riots were repressed by the army, resulting in tens 
of deaths.
21
 More recently, in 2012, UGTT sensed a repeat of 1978 and an 
attempt against its very existence. On 4 December 2012, as the union was 
gearing up to commemorate the 60
th
 anniversary of the assassination of its 
founder, its iconic headquarters, Place Mohamed Ali, was attacked by 
                                                 
21
 The ruling party attempted to install a parallel trade union under the pretext of “rectifying 
the direction” of a UGTT whose leadership was judged to be openly hostile to the ruling 
party and government policies, and a nest for left-wing dissent. One justification for this 
move was put forth by an important leader of the government loyalist group, Abdessattar 
Al Chennawi: “[the UGTT leadership] turned the Union into an open field for the 
opposition of all orientations except Destouri unionists, for the Destour Party is not 
represented in the union while known and prominent opposition figures hold high offices in 
UGTT. For this reason, 90% of ‘the honourables’ come from the Destour party”. AL-
HADDAD, Salim. al-ittihad al-am al-tunisi li al-shukghl wa al-nidham al-burguibi [The 
Tunisian General Union of Labour and Bourguiba’s Regime: Between Harmony and 
Confrontation] Vol. 2. Tunis: UGTT Documentation and Research Unit, 2011, p. 286.  
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groups known as Leagues for the Protection of the Revolution. The incident 
was ugly, public and of immediate impact. These leagues originated in 
community organisation in cities across the country designed to keep order 
and security immediately after 14 January 2011, which were later 
disbanded, and become dominated by Islamists of various orientations. On 
26 August 2013, a group of trade unionists founded the Tunisian Labour 
Organization, which aims according to its leaders at correcting the direction 
of UGTT. To the attack on its offices, UGTT responded by boycotting the 
government, organizing regional strikes and marches, and eventually calling 
for a general strike on Thursday 13 December, the first such action since 
1978. To the founding of a parallel union, Sami Tahri, the UGTT 
spokesman, reacted with dismissal, arguing that this was no more than the 
reaction of losers who could not win elected offices in UGTT and failed to 
drag the union into the “house of obedience”, referring to the new 
organization’s ties to the Al-Nahda party.22 Tahri’s confident tone and 
political statement are backed up by history, which demonstrates that the 
UGTT has warded off several attempts at takeover, division or weakening 
over the past sixty years or so, as I mentioned above. This time, too, it 
prevailed.  
Despite antagonistic relations with governments before and after the 
revolution, or perhaps because of them, UGTT remained arguably the only 
body in the country qualified to resolve disputes peacefully, but also to offer 
mediation albeit with a view to defend its own positions. After January 
2011, it emerged as the key mediator and power broker in the initial phase 
of the revolution, when all political players trusted and needed it. And it was 
at the initiative of the union that the committee regulating the transition to 
the elections of 23 October 2011 was formed.
23
 UGTT’s role was crucial in 
framing debate, steering decision-making in the chaotic period, starting the 
Council for the Protection of the Revolution, and serving as meeting place 
of all the parties at a time when parties were either small, insignificant 
politically or formed recently.
24
 At the same time, UGTT used its leverage 
                                                 
22
 On the attack by the Leagues, see Tahri’s response: http://elaph.com/Web/news/2012/ 
12/779396.html. 
23
 The so-called Ben Achour Committee named after its president, the constitutional scholar 
Iyadh Ben Achour, was called initially the Higher Political Reform Commission, set up on 
17 January 2011. UGTT was instrumental in its expansion and constitution as a body to 
control the interim government and run the transition to the election of the National 
Constituent Assembly, under the new name, The Higher Authority for Realisation of the 
Objectives of the Revolution, Political Reform and Democratic Transition as an 
amalgamation between the original commission and the Council for the Protection of the 
Revolution set up by UGTT, political parties and civil society organizations. See testimony 
by Ben Achour dated 30 April 2011 in Temimi. Observatory Vol. 1, pp. 181-208. 
24
 UGTT called for this council on 15 January and hosted it. Ibid., p. 258. 
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to secure historic victories for its members and for workers in general, 
including an agreement to secure permanent contracts for over 140,000 
temporary workers and pay raises for several sectors, including teachers, as 
well as a rise in the minimum wage for the agricultural sector.  
As Tunisia moved from the period of revolutionary harmony in 
which UGTT played host and facilitator, to a political, and even ideological 
phase, characterised by a multiplicity of parties and polarisation of public 
opinion, the union was challenged to keep its engagement in politics without 
falling under the control of a particular party or indeed turning into one. But, 
due to historical reasons, which saw leftists channel their energy into trade 
unionism when their political activities were curtailed, UGTT remained on 
the left side of politics and, in the face of rising Islamist power, became a 
place where the Left, despite its many newly-formed parties, kept its ties 
and even strengthened them.
25
 For these reasons, UGTT remained strong 
and decidedly outside the control of Islamists. But they, in turn, could not 
ignore its role and its status, nor could other parties, particularly the newly 
formed, centrist party, Nida Tunis. At the grassroots level, Islamists kept 
their membership and took part in UGTT-led labour action, and continue to 
do so today. At the level of leadership, and after attempts to weaken it by 
supporting a parallel union as I mentioned above, they were compelled to 
settle with the fact that the organization held the key to social peace in the 
country.  
It is remarkable, but not surprising, that during the crisis of 2013, 
which resulted from the assassination of the Leftist leader Chokri Belaid and 
the pressure on the Al-Nahda-led government to resign, the balance of 
power and much of the rational management of the deep political crisis 
depended on the UGTT and its partners, the Tunisian Association of Human 
Rights, the Lawyers’ Association and the UTICA (the Tunisian Union of 
Industry, Commerce and Traditional Crafts), known as the Quartet. All 
parties spoke through the UGTT and on the basis of its initiative which 
consisted in dissolving the government, the appointment of a non-political 
government, curtailing the work of the ANC (National Constituent 
Assembly), reviewing top government appointments and dissolving the 
UGTT’s arch enemy, the Leagues for the Defence of the Revolution.26 
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 The Executive Bureau of the UGTT emerging from the Tabarka congress held on 25-29 
December 2011 was dominated by the forces which make up the Popular Front 
(specifically, the Patriotic Democratic current; the Pan-Arab nationalist parties and the 
Workers’ Communist Party). 
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Union leaders are known to be experienced negotiators and patient and 
tireless activists. They honed their skills over decades of settling disputes 
and negotiating deals. For these reasons, they were able to conduct 
marathon negotiations with the opposing parties and remain above 
accusations of outright bias. This is not an isolated initiative or a new one by 
UGTT. In fact as early as 1951, the union served as leader and convenor of 
Tunisian civil society against French rule. On 12 May 1951, it invited the 
General Union of Tunisian Farmers, The Tunisian Craftsmen’s and 
Tradesmen’ Union and the Neo-Destour Party to help set up The Committee 
for the Defence of Constitutional Guarantees and Representation of the 
People.
27
 Hached also represented Tunisia at the United Nations in 1952, 
months before his assassination.  
 
UGTT between post-revolution dynamics and limited ambition  
With a labour movement engrained in the political culture of the 
country, and at all levels, a culture of trade unionism has become a 
component of Tunisian society. Yet, there has not been a proper sociology 
of this despite the important implications to Tunisia as a whole.
28
 Protest 
culture in Tunisia has been deeply affected by labour unionism, which has 
been tenacious, issue-oriented, uneven and mostly organized. But UGTT 
has also been affected, in turn, by the political left, the student movement 
and women’s movement, as I will demonstrate below. The unevenness runs 
largely along the degree of unionisation and militancy. For example, the 
education sector tended to be the most vocal and most organised. 
Agricultural workers and white-collar workers are also unionized, and even 
intellectuals had to work within the confines of or in synch with unions. For 
the political Left, one challenge after 2011 has been in fact how to move 
away from being trade unionists and become politicians; in other words, 
how to think beyond small issues and using unionist means in order to 
tackle wider issues and adopt their attendant methods. This meant finding 
different and broader bases for political alliances and laying out projects for 
society at large, rather than for sectors or sections of it. Yet, it is remarkable 
                                                                                                                            
thawra al-tunisiyya wa al-rabi’ al-arabi: ahammiyat al-tahawwulat al-juyusiyasiyya. [The 
Tunisian Revolution and the Arab Spring: the importance of geopolitical changes]. Tunis: 
FTRSI, 2012. pp. 171-192.  
27
 See the manifesto issued by this meeting in the Tunisian Office for National Liberation in 
New York in Farhat Hached: Tunisian labor leader, patriot, martyr. [New York: the 
Tunisian Office for National Liberation, 1953], pp.30-31. 
28
 It was remarkable how during my field work in al-Sha’b newspaper and the UGTT local 
offices, people came to the union to look for jobs, financial aid, or even to solve personal 
disputes. This was no new trend, UGTT officials assured me. 
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how post-2011 alliances have broadly kept the same patterns operating 
within UGTT before the revolution. The Popular Front, which is made up 
mainly of the parties that have affiliation within the executive bureau of the 
UGTT, has not had much success in recruiting members from outside its 
union bases.
29
 Even their interlocutors in Nida Tunis, which leads the 
current coalition government, are also trade unionists, most prominently 
Tayeb Baccouche, a former Secretary General of UGTT from 1981 to 1984.  
The interface between UGTT and the student and women 
movements which are both exceptionally active in Tunisia has been 
significant and not without paradoxes. There have been close relations 
between the main student union, the General Union of Tunisian Students 
(Union générale des étudiants de Tunisie, UGET) and the wider labour 
movement both in activism and in membership, as the university tended to 
be a training ground, which prepared leaders to be active in UGTT once 
they leave education. The UGET, which was founded in 1952, has worked 
closely with the UGTT since then and both would gradually move away 
from the ruling party, albeit at a different pace. The radicalisation and even 
what might be termed the leftist turn in unionism in fact finds some of its 
roots in this flow, as the university in Tunisia, particularly in the 1960s, 70s 
and 80s was a space of radical activism and left wing politics, which was 
barred from open political organization under successive governments.
30
 It 
supplied the UGTT with its most radical elements at the low and middle-
levels of the organization.  
With regard to women, a key paradox of the UGTT has been its 
support of women’s causes, but reluctance to promote women to its own 
leadership. The widespread practice of limiting women’s access to the glass 
ceiling does not truly apply to other aspects of civil society institutions in 
Tunisia. Women have reached the presidency of UTICA, the Journalists’ 
Association and the Magistrates’ Association. While the absence of women 
in the leadership of UGTT could be explained by the very nature of trade 
union work, which requires time and presence in public places which are not 
                                                 
29
 For a full view of the Tunisian Left, see MOULDI, Guessoumi. “The Map of the 
Tunisian Left”. In KLAFAT, Kalil (ed.) Mapping the Arab Left: Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, 
Sudan, Morocco, Algeria. [Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, 2014], pp. 16-42. On the Popular 
Front and its composition, see the same publication.  
30
 On the early history of the student movement, see DHIFALLAH, Mohamed. Al-madraj 
wa al-kursi: dirasat hawla al-talabah al-tunisiyyin bayna 1961 wa 1981: nash’at 
antalligensia [The amphitheater and the chair studies on Tunisian students between the 
1950s and the 1970s. [Sfax, 2003] (in Arabic); and CHAGROUCHE, Tahar. Le movement 
étudiant tunisien, 1961-1981: genèse d’une intelligentsia] [Unpublished thesis, Université 
Paris VII, 1984]. 
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friendly to women, such as cafes, this remains a serious lacuna of UGTT, 
which is challenged to be at a step with, if not leading, in this area. In 
Tunisia, this is particularly important as the role of women has been a 
marking feature of the society at large and of its protest culture in particular 
throughout the post-independent period, within and outside the labor 
movement. 
The union has also been accused of bureaucracy and corruption at 
the top level, which triggered several attempts at internal reform and even 
rebellion over the years. There is in fact considerable power and money 
associated with being a top union official in Tunisia, which, in a climate of 
rampant corruption led many leaders to collude with businesses and the 
government; the discredited former Secretary General Tayeb Sahbbani is an 
example of this. But this had less effect on grass-root support, local chapters 
and the middle cadre of the union. Since 2011, UGTT seems to have 
regained the cohesion it lacked during the Ben Ali period when the gap 
between the leadership and the grassroots was wide. Yet, the practice of 
democracy and plurality in Tunisia over the past half century was almost the 
exclusive domain of the university and the trade unions. Both had electoral 
campaigns for office, sometimes outside the control of the state, as was the 
case in the university during the 1970s and 80s. In fact, the state stepped in 
specifically to quell such practices when the outcome was not in its favour. 
Two memorable incidents testify to this.  
The first one was in 1972, when the majority of students defeated the 
ruling party lists and secured the independence of the UGET. The second 
was in 1978 when the ruling party was overruled by the UGTT leadership, 
as I mentioned above. In both cases, the government proceeded to take over 
or ban the unions. The type of democratic practice in these two institutions 
was also in place in the Lawyers’ Association and some other minor civil 
society associations which were all severely repressed, notably, the Judges’ 
Association, the Tunisian League of Human Rights and the Journalists’ 
Association. It is no surprise that two of these have led the reconciliation 
effort and that all four worked in concert and at the forefront of preserving 
the aims of the revolution, particularly freedom, dignity and the right to 
work. The coming together of these associations has, I argue, mutually 
affected all of them, not only in terms of widening the field of protest, but 
also in terms of bringing to the fore the wider issues of human rights and 
freedoms. Democratic practice was therefore linked not to the normal 
running of society, i.e., as a practice of citizenship, but as an opposition or 
resistance activity. This gave democracy a militant edge, which it did not 
lose, but which also affected its character. It was in a sense a democratic act 
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to protect the union against non-democratic dominant forces, including and 
chiefly the ruling party and its student and labour arms. The practice of 
citizenship was not possible during the authoritarian rule of the one-party 
system while elections in the UGTT and other key civil society 
organizations were not aimed necessarily at producing the leadership most 
capable of advancing union professional interests and demands, but to keep 
the ruling party at bay. Hence the weak presence, if not outright absence, of 
ruling party members in most union offices for decades.  
The gradual coming together of these strong civil society institutions 
shaped a critical mass whose weight was impossible to ignore. Attempts to 
dominate this coalition aimed at shaping the future of the country and its 
revolution as a whole. The Al-Nahda party, for example, ignored this 
coalition for a while, but ended up accepting the solution the UGTT and its 
partners negotiated, when they realized that an open alliance of the UGTT 
with the opposition in a coalition would become hard to beat. A key 
moment was when the UGTT declared a national strike in the aftermath of 
Belaid’s assassination at a time when Al-Nahda was accused of having a 
hand in the killing.  
 
Conclusion 
A combination of symbolic capital of resistance accumulated over 
decades, a solid record of results for its members and the working people as 
a whole, and a well-oiled machine at the level of organisation across the 
country and sectors of the economy, made the UGTT unassailable and 
unavoidable at the same time. It has been a key feature of Tunisian political 
and social life and a defining element of what some have called the Tunisian 
“exception” in the MENA region. For this reason, in times of national 
discord, the UGTT has been capable of credible mediation and power 
brokering. It also remains a key guarantor that social justice, a main aim of 
the revolution, would remain on the agenda. Yet, the UGTT faces an 
unprecedented situation where a separation between politics and unionism is 
likely. Its own challenges are to remain the strongest union at a time when 
three other splits union have emerged, and to maintain a political role now 
that politics has been largely turned over to political parties. But the 
realignment between liberal and the main Islamist party in a strong 
coalition, changed the game altogether. The UGTT is now trying to find its 
feet, especially now that its driving activist force, Leftists, are in a minority 
political opposition.  
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There are many who regret the reluctance on the part of the union, 
which was a powerful king maker in the early months of the revolution, to 
step in and take control of the country. They argue that by failing to do so it 
had effectively handed over power to its own enemies, namely neoliberals 
or Islamist parties. On why the union did not form a labour party, although 
the moment was ripe for it, Abid Briki, spokesperson of the UGTT in 2011, 
commented in March 2011: “This may weaken the UGTT, and may push us 
to real union plurality. The strength of the UGTT comes from the presence 
of all political factions within its ranks. If we were to rush into founding a 
party, the union would turn partisan, which would weaken it and encourage 
other parties to form their own unions”.31  
So far the union continues to be held together and is active in the on-
going social protests, but its political role has been reduced considerably. 
The balance of political power in the country has not yet been settled, but 
the latest elections moved it towards the centre in a combination of the old 
guard, rising Islamists and business. No major economic and social gains 
have been made to address grievances supported by the revolution and the 
UGTT, making strong trade unionism much needed today. Whether the 
revolution would mark the end of the political dimension of the UGTT, or 
whether it would consolidate a de facto alliance with Leftist parties, remains 
to be seen. The UGTT is no ordinary union. It has determined the character 
and impact of the labor movement and affected Tunisia as a whole since the 
late 1940s. It impacted significantly the 2011 revolution and the transition 
period, and is likely to play an important role in the future of the country. In 
this, it is unparalleled elsewhere in the Arab world. And it is largely because 
of it that one may confidently say that Tunisia is not Egypt, or Syria or 
Libya or Yemen. Before 2011, the confluence between a largely secular and 
humanist opposition and an engrained labour activism have been, I claim, 
the main bases of a Tunisian formation, which allowed the development of a 
culture of resistance to authoritarianism with a specific humanist and social 
justice content. At the same time, the UGTT, and the culture it nurtured, 
were perhaps not revolutionary enough to provide the leadership and the 
ambition necessary to turn the 2011 uprising into a workers’ revolution. 
Instead, it took part, a constructive one, in structuring the transition to a 
political phase where it may see its own role curtailed, a phase in which 
radical politics could be freed from the political limitations of trade 
unionism. The challenge facing the UGTT is to maintain the independence 
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 Testimony by Abid Briki, spokesperson of UGTT during the period of the revolution on 
26 March 2011. See marsad al-thawrah al-tunisiyya [observatory of Tunisian 
Revolution]vol. 3, Tunis: FTERSI, .p. 271.  
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and appeal of the organization as a sure, and necessary, refuge should 
neoliberalism or Islamists win the day and should plurality in organized 
labour follow the fractious political field.  
 
 From the Everyday to Contentious Collective Actions: the 
protests of Jordan Phosphate Mines Company employees 
between 2011 and 2014 
Claudie Fioroni 
 
 
ntroduction  
Workers’ struggles in the Middle East have raised little attention in 
academic literature. The Middle East remains on the fringes of labour 
movement literature. The study of social movements in the region has 
focused mostly on identity-based mobilisations, human rights movements 
and the range of actions countering dispossession from urban mass protests 
to “quiet encroachment”.1 This does not mean, however, that the region has 
been spared from labour protests. Labour organisation and activism can be 
dated back to the late 19
th 
century.
2
 Since then, the magnitude and the 
motivations of labour activism have, indeed, greatly varied depending on 
national and local contexts, governmental policies and economic 
conjunctures. During the struggles for independence, labour activism was 
closely intertwined with the nationalist cause. After independence, however, 
authoritarian politics in the Gulf and the rapid growth of employment 
opportunities in the public sector after 1973 hampered the development of 
labour movements in most Middle Eastern countries. Yet, one can observe 
the resurgence of labour protests since the mid-1990s in different countries 
including Egypt, Iran, Jordan and the Arabic Peninsula among others.
3
 In 
                                                 
1 
BAYAT, Asef. Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2009. 
2
 LOCKMAN, Zachary (ed.). Workers and working classes in the Middle East: struggles, 
histories, historiographies. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994.  
3 
Among authors who noticed the increase in labour protests see DUBOC, Marie. “La 
contestation sociale en Egypte depuis 2004: entre précarité et mobilisation locale.”  Revue 
Tiers-Monde, Hors série, 2011, pp. 1-21; CHALCRAFT, John. “Labour Protests and 
I 
Claudie Fioroni 31 
 
Workers of the World, Volume I, Number 7, November 2015 
 
the context of the popular uprisings in 2011, thousands of workers and 
employees took to the street to protest with their colleagues.
4
 The large 
mobilisation of workers and employees during the so-called “Arab Springs” 
invites us to take a closer look at the motivations behind these labour 
protests. 
This article provides new empirical insights in labour activism in the 
Middle East based on the analysis of the contentious collective actions of 
workers at the Jordan Phosphate Mines Company (JPMC). The mobilisation 
began in April 2011, shortly after popular uprisings erupted in the Arab 
region. A group of approximately thirty employees launched a three-day sit-
in in front of the company’s headquarters in Amman. On the signs held by 
the demonstrators, one could read slogans denouncing corruption and 
mismanagement, asking for new bylaws, a new personnel system and the 
fair treatment of employees. Significantly, the General Trade Union of 
Mines and Mining Employees (GTUMME) did not take part in the sit-in. 
After three days, the company’s managers met with sit-in leaders and trade 
union representatives, reaching an agreement with the trade union that failed 
to meet demonstrators’ expectations. In response, sit-in leaders announced 
the establishment of the independent union on Labour Day, May 1
st
 2011. 
They then visited JPMC production sites in Hasâ,
5
 `Abyiad and Shyiddyieh 
and the fertilizer complex in Aqaba to mobilise and prepare employees to 
strike. The first general strike was held in June 2011 and was followed by a 
second in February 2012. All production sites took part in the strikes. The 
company had never witnessed any major strike before. Such mobilisation 
was unprecedented in JPMC. How do we explain this sudden upsurge in 
JPMC employees' activism in 2011? 
Literature examining what drives recent labour protests in the 
Middle East usually implicates globalisation and neoliberal economic 
                                                                                                                            
Hegemony in Egypt and in the Arabian Peninsula.” In: MOTTA, Sara C. [and al.] (eds.), 
Social Movements in the Global South: Dispossession, Development and Resistance. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, pp. 35-58; BAYAT, Asef. “Social Movements, Activism 
and Social Development in the Middle East.” Geneva: United Nations Research Institute 
for Social Development, 2000 and ALEXANDER, Ann and BASSIOUNY, Mostafa. 
Bread, Freedom, Social Justice. Workers and the Egyptian Revoultion. London: Zed 
Books, 2014. On Jordan see, ADELY, Fida. “The Emergence of a New Labor Movement in 
Jordan.” Middle East Research and Information Project, 264, 2012. 
4
 BEININ, Joel. “Le rôle des ouvriers dans les soulèvements populaires arabes de 
2011”.  Le mouvement social. 246(1), 2014, pp. 7-27.  
5
 The transliteration of Arabic words follows the IJMES transliteration system with the 
exception of the following letters that are translated as follows: â for ا ; d for ض ; z for ظ ; t 
for ط ; h for ح. 
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reforms.
6
 Since the implementation of the first structural adjustment 
programmes (SAP) under the auspices of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank during the 1980s, workers and employees have 
experienced privatisation, casualisation of work, a decline in real wages, 
price increase and cuts in subsidies. In this context, labour struggles have 
been predominantly interpreted as “defensive”7 aiming to defend 
developmentalist era rights and entitlements now threatened by neoliberal 
reforms. In her well-known article, Posusney
8
 demonstrates that the moral 
economy argument according to which protests “erupt when the feelings of 
entitlement have been violated"
9
 best explains labour protests in Egypt. Are 
labour protests always defensive? As Duboc and Beinin rightly note, the 
"concept of moral economy only partially explains the dynamics of labour 
protests… [Since] it overlooks initiatives to challenge state-controlled 
unions and denounce corruption and bad management".
10
  
In fact, the mobilisation of JPMC employees defies assumptions 
underlying the moral economy perspective on labour movement in the 
Middle East. Demonstration leaders did not seek to preserve existing rights, 
but rather to overhaul the long-established management system that, 
according to them, resulted in the unequal treatment of the employees. Yet, 
JPMC employees did experience economic liberalisation and budget 
austerity. Crippled by unsustainable level of debts, the Jordanian 
government initiated market-oriented reforms as early as the mid-1980s. 
This shift was further supported by a series of IMF and the World Bank 
agreements during the 1990s. However, observers agree that the most 
substantial reforms were not undertaken until King Abdallah II acceded to 
the throne in 1999.
11
 Analyses of the political and economic consequences 
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 See among others: BAYAT, A. “Social Movements, Activism and Social Development in 
the Middle East.” Op. Cit. ; DUBOC, M. “La contestation sociale en Egypte depuis 2004: 
entre précarité et mobilisation locale. ”  Op. Cit. ; CHALCRAFT, J. “Labour Protests and 
Hegemony in Egypt and in the Arabian Peninsula.” Op. Cit.; BEININ, J. “Le rôle des 
ouvriers dans les soulèvements populaires arabes de 2011. ” Op. Cit.  
7
 BEININ, J. “Le rôle des ouvriers dans les soulèvements populaires arabes de 2011.” Ibid., 
p. 8. 
8
 POSUSNEY, M.P. “Irrational Workers: The Moral Economy of Labor Protest in Egypt”. 
World Politics. Vol.4, n. 1, October 1993, pp.83-120. 
9
 Ibid., pp. 118-119. 
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 DUBOC, Marie and BEININ, Joel. “A Workers’ Social Movement on the Margin of the 
Global Neoliberal Order, Egypt 2004-2012.” In: BEININ, Joel and VAIREL, Frédéric 
(eds.), Social Movements, Mobilization and Contestation in the Middle East and North 
Africa. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2nd edition, 2013, p. 208. 
11
 EL SAID, Hamid. “The Political Economy of Reform in Jordan. Breaking Resistance to 
Reform?” In: JOFFE, George (eds). Jordan in Transition (1990-2000). London: C. 
Hurst&Co, 2002, pp. 254-277; KNOWLES, Warwick. Jordan since 1989. A Study in 
Political Economy. New York: Tauris, 2005. 
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of neoliberal reforms in Jordan stress the growing tensions between East 
Bankers and Palestinians. As the main beneficiaries of the state welfare 
system, the former bore the brunt of cuts to subsidies and public sector 
downsizing whereas the latter, historically confined to the private sector, 
benefited from the reforms.
12
 Yet, these conclusions usually rely on macro-
level analyses and little is known about how ordinary Jordanians perceived 
and responded to on-going transformations. 
For JPMC employees, structural adjustment policies resulted in the 
privatisation of their company. On closer inspection, however, JPMC 
employees’ experience did not match with the neoliberal prophecy of 
rationalisation, efficiency gains, and casualisation. JPMC holds the 
monopoly on phosphate mining in Jordan. It was publicly owned from 1953 
until 2006. The privatisation of JPMC was particularly controversial for two 
main reasons. Not only did the government sell 37% of its shares to Kamil 
Holding Ltd., an offshore company registered in the tax haven of Jersey, 
UK,
13
, but also Walid el Kurdi, the brother-in-law of the late King Hussein, 
was personally involved in the process of the privatisation and became the 
head of the company in 2006. Hence, for many Jordanians, JPMC was not 
privatised but rather taken over by the Hashemite monarchy. In addition, the 
injection of private capital did not lead to major reforms in management 
practices and labour organisation. The company remained largely 
overstaffed and, thus, the workload was relatively low. In fact, while 
remaining on the payroll, many employees simply did not work. The sale 
agreement prevented the new owner from dismissing any employees after 
2006 and employees’ social and financial benefits increased between 2006 
and 2010. Whereas no other recently privatised companies – some of which 
had experienced cuts in jobs and management rationalisation – witnessed 
protests of the same magnitude, JPMC became a hotbed of labour protest in 
2011. To understand the emergence of protests at JPMC, it is thus important 
to take a closer look at how privatisation affected the employees’ lived 
experiences of the workplace. 
 
                                                 
12
 This view masks the fact that the reforms were tailored-made to best serve the interests of 
the ruling elite from among which the majority considers themselves as East Bankers (See 
EL SAID, H. “The Political Economy of Reform in Jordan. Breaking Resistance to 
Reform?” Op. cit.). 
13
 Source: JFSC Companies Registry Website. URL: 
https://www.jerseyfsc.org/registry/documentsearch/NameDetail.aspx?Id=31488 (accessed 
on 18 July 2015). 
34 The protests of Jordan Phosphate Mines Company employees between… 
 
 
Based on an ethnographic study of JPMC employees’ mobilisation 
efforts, this article explores the motivations driving these workplace-based 
protests. More specifically, I examine the role of everyday workplace 
experiences shaping the motivations and aspirations of employees. I argue 
that, behind the denunciation of privatisation, corruption and favouritism, 
JPMC demonstrators were divided between two contrasting demands: the 
claims to meritocracy, on the one hand, and claims for a larger share in the 
wealth allocation, on the other hand. I argue that this divide was rooted in 
the everyday experience of the workplace. I focus on the emergence of 
mobilisation efforts rather than their later developments, paying particular 
attention to employees’ morality of employment.14 Hence, I share with the 
moral economy approach particular attention toward the role of everyday 
life in shaping how employees differentiate good from bad, fair from unfair, 
and right from wrong, and in turn intimately fashioning the nature of their 
demands and actions. This constitutes the frame of reference through which 
they define their demands and actions. In this respect, I pay specific 
attention to the workplace because it constitutes the shared framework of 
reference through which employees formulated their demands.
15
  
Section one depicts some of the distinctive traits of the employees’ 
everyday experience in the workplace by focusing more specifically on their 
daily encounter with management practices that allow many employees not 
to work. In section two, I explain the emergence of employees’ protests in 
2011, highlighting how employees’ grievances converged upon a critique of 
privatisation, corruption and favouritism associated with Walid el Kurdi. 
Firstly I examine how employees associated their frustrations with the 
privatisation of JPMC and, secondly I demonstrate the central role the 
“Arab Spring” played in defining demonstrators’ desires and strategies. 
Section three unravels the contrasting views and experiences that divided 
the employees between those who aspire to meritocracy and those who 
emphasised the allocation of wealth. These differences shaped how 
employees formulated their grievances, interpreted the consequences of 
privatisation and articulated their demands and expectations. 
 
                                                 
14
 By morality of employment, I mean the set of values on which the duties and 
entitlements inherent to the employment relationship are grounded.  
15 
The workplace is not the only locus of the production of the employees’ subjectivities. 
The latter is also shaped outside the workplace. See THOMPSON, Edward, P. The Making 
of the English Working Class. New York: Vintage Books, 1966. The study of factors 
outside the workplace, however, goes beyond the scope of this article that aims to explain 
how the workplace shapes the mobilisation of the employees. 
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1. Setting the context: the everyday encounters with 
management practices 
It’s 9.30 am. I am at the `Abyiad mine to meet with an employee 
who played an active role in the strikes. We are sitting in one of the offices 
of the administrative building. Shortly after our discussion begins, two 
employees join us and the initial interview turns into a lengthy group 
discussion on working conditions in the mine, privatisation and the strike as 
well as religion and cultural differences. A thick coat of dust covers the 
furniture and the office equipment. It has probably been a while since 
someone has sat here. The discussion goes on for hours. Around 1pm, we 
hear the call to prayer and the three men leave the room. After their return a 
few minutes later, the discussion continues, but is not as lively as before. 
Everyone looks tired. Some are close to dozing off. The three employees 
keep checking the time on their mobile phones. At 3.30pm, they decide to 
move towards the main gate to clock-out. It is half an hour before the end of 
official working hours. None of them was requested to work at any point 
during the day. 
In the `Abyiad mine, as in other facilities of JPMC, many employees 
simply do not work. According to the mine directors, between 60% and 
80% of the workforce is unnecessary. The fact that some employees do not 
work at JPMC results from overstaffing and a lack of rationalisation of the 
labour organisation. Recruitment practices aim not only to hire skilled and 
efficient labour, but also to provide for livelihood, to fuel clientelistic 
relations and to co-opt those who are too openly critical of the company. In 
the 1970s, JPMC started to hire Jordanian citizens exclusively. In the mines, 
JPMC used to recruit largely from neighbouring populations, who usually 
occupied low-skilled positions, such as guards and drivers, whereas high-
skilled employees were predominantly from the northern and urban areas. 
According to a former General Director of JPMC, the hiring among the 
local population aimed to contain unemployment and, thus, to prevent the 
migration of southern population to the poor urban areas in northern 
Jordan.
16
 The company also recruited local leaders, such as members of 
parliament and tribal leaders, who played a role as intermediaries between 
the company and the community. However, overstaffing was not restricted 
to low-skilled labour. During the 1980s and 1990s, when access to Gulf 
markets was closed to Jordanian labour,
17
 JPMC started to recruit more 
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Interview, Amman, July 2014. 
17
 See BEL-AIR, Françoise. “Politiques d'immigration de travail et construction nationale 
en Jordanie (1975-2002). ” In: JABER, Hana and METRAL, France (eds.), Mondes en 
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widely among engineers and geologists to reduce unemployment among 
high-skilled Jordanian labour.  
In this context, there was no need to mobilize the entire workforce. 
While the sociology of work usually assumes that managers aim to put 
employees to work, at JPMC managers do not need to mobilize the entire 
workforce to achieve production objectives. For this, they could rely on a 
few skilful employees. In fact, managerial practices provided few incentives 
for employees to work. The best and brightest employees were often 
compelled to work longer hours with no adequate compensation whereas 
absenteeism was rarely punished. Yet the lack of incentives to work did not 
mean a lack of rules or hierarchy. While most employees’ productive 
capacities were not tightly controlled, their freedom of speech was. 
Managerial practices prioritized the ability to mobilise social capital and 
obedience rather than hard work, and those who were too critical of 
management were given disciplinary transfers. Most employees believed 
that it is more efficient to rely on personal connections than on hard work to 
be promoted or to obtain a salary increase. The management vacuum in 
controlling employees’ productive capacities provided a wide room of 
manoeuvre for the employees which resulted in an uneven allocation of the 
workload between employees. In practice, a complex combination of factors 
influenced who did and did not work, such as the nature of the job, 
employees’ qualifications and personality, the personality of his superior 
and the location of the workplace.  
The impact of the privatization on the workload was ambiguous. 
Prior to privatisation, the Board of Directors ceased hiring after 1999 and 
the company launched an early-retirement scheme in 2000 (known as the 
hawâfez 2000; hawâfez literally means incentives) to reduce the number of 
employees. As a result, between 1999 and 2010 the number of employees 
decreased from 6,425 to 3,767. However, this did not result in an increase in 
workload. In 2013, most of my interlocutors associated privatisation with a 
diminution of the workload. In the mining sites, workload reduction was a 
direct consequence of an extension of the company's outsourcing strategy. 
Outsourcing was not new to JPMC but has significantly increased since 
2010, to the extent that JPMC teams are completely replaced by contractors 
for mining activities. The production departments in the mines were the 
most directly affected by this evolution. This situation has created 
resentment among employees who used to be committed to their job and 
                                                                                                                            
mouvements. Migrants et migrations au Moyen-Orient au tournant du XXIème siècle. 
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who found themselves useless after the privatization. In addition, many 
employees at headquarters felt isolated by a concentration of decision-
making power in the hands of those working closely with Walid el-Kurdi. 
However, while some departments were deprived of activity, others such as 
the maintenance department remained understaffed. This resulted in the 
increase of the workload for some employees who were already working 
hard.  
JPMC management was compelled by two imperatives. It needed not 
only to produce phosphate, but also to sustain a certain kind of relation 
between the sovereign and the population based on the considerable 
allocation of wealth through employment, subsidies and other material 
benefits. This duality of the management system shaped the employees' 
everyday experience of the workplace characterised by an unevenly 
allocated workload, favouritism, and a failure to recognize hard work. They 
realised that access to jobs, as well as better salaries and positions depended 
less on qualifications and experience than on the ability to mobilise social 
capital. As the following sections demonstrate, JPMC employees’ protests 
reacted first and foremost to the immediate experience of the workplace. 
However, while all employees shared a sense of unfairness, they expressed 
contrasting moralities of employment and, thus, diverging demands. 
 
2. Converging grievances: the uprising against favouritism, 
corruption and the privatisation 
The uprising against favouritism 
To rally the workers, strike leaders circulated the pay slip of Walid el 
Kurdi's son, who is also the King’s maternal cousin, and who was paid five 
times more than experienced engineers despite his lack of experience and 
qualification. For employees, this represented an extreme case of 
favouritism whereby some employees obtained special benefits according to 
their personal relations. This strategy of circulating the pay slip was very 
successful for two main reasons. First, the inequity of Walid el-Kurdi’s 
son’s salary echoed the employees’ everyday experiences of unequal 
treatment. When asked about the reason for unequal treatment, the 
employees have no word but “wâstah!” In this context, wâstah takes on two 
different but interrelated meanings. First, in spoken Arabic, the term wâstah 
(literally “the middle”) refers to the person who mediates or intercedes on 
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behalf of another person.
18
 In the context of JPMC, the wâstah might act as 
a mediator during the recruitment process. In this case, the wâstah is the 
individual, usually a member of parliament, a tribal leader or other official, 
who intercedes on behalf of the job seeker. The wâstah might also interfere 
in decisions regarding the personal situation of an employee such as 
promotion, transfer, leaves and housing among other things. In this case, the 
wâstah is a superior. The wâstah as intercession, however, has a negative 
connotation. This leads us to the second meaning. The term wâstah is more 
largely employed as a catchword for any action that is considered unfair. 
My interlocutors often used it to discredit decisions and behaviours that put 
them at a disadvantage. This entailed a wide range of practices that did not 
necessarily involve the intercession of a wâstah. Most of the time, it implied 
decisions based on personal relations (âlaqat shakhsieh) such as, for 
instance, the hiring of Walid el-Kurdi's son in JPMC. In this sense, the term 
wâstah implied favouritism more than intercession. JPMC employees used 
it to refer to any decisions or practices that resulted in the unequal treatment 
of the employees.  
In addition, by targeting the head of the company and his relatives 
exclusively, the leaders of the independent union revived the employees’ 
frustrations with regard to privatisation. Privatisation of JPMC remains 
highly controversial. The decision was taken in the utmost secrecy fuelling 
rumours regarding the new owner and the potential consequences for 
employees. The owner of Kamil Holding Ltd., the major shareholder of 
JPMC, remains unknown. In addition, the fact that the new head of JPMC, 
Walid el Kurdi, had matrimonial ties with the Hashemite monarchy 
nourished suspicions of corruption. Employees largely shared the opinion 
that JPMC was taken over by the ruling family rather than privatised. A 
number of Walid el Kurdi’s decisions further enhanced suspicions of 
corruption and embezzlement. Not only was he concurrently holding the 
function of both Chief Executive Officer and President of the Board of 
Directors, but he also suspended most of the standard decision-making 
procedures. He personally appointed new recruits. The deals he concluded 
with several contracting companies were regarded with great scepticism. In 
this context, the pay slip of Walid el Kurdi’s son exacerbated existing 
evidence of corruption. In 2011, employees united against Walid el-Kurdi, 
who had become an emblem of the corruption associated with JPMC’s 
privatisation. Moreover, such accusations directed toward Walid el Kurdi 
hinted at the perceived corruption of the Palace. Given the matrimonial ties, 
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many observers interpreted the protests against Walid el Kurdi as an indirect 
attack on the King. This dimension was explicit in the narratives of some of 
JPMC employees who took part in the strikes, showing that these grievances 
had been latent at least since the privatisation. Why did the employees not 
launch protests earlier? To understand the timing of the protests, it is 
necessary to look at them in light of the regional and national context. 
 
The “Arab Spring” effect 
In 2011, the Arab region experienced some of the most momentous 
changes in its post-colonial history. Whereas Arab societies were perceived 
as crippled by political passivity, Ben 'Ali, Mubârak, Qadhâfi and Sâleh, 
who had ruled for decades, suddenly fell under the pressure of popular 
protests. In Jordan, social and political tensions were palpable before 2011. 
The mobilisation of the daily workers in the agricultural sector in 2006, the 
Aqaba port strike in 2009, and the government teachers’ campaign for union 
representation in 2010 paved the way for the organisation of the 
independent labour movement in 2011.
19
 Furthermore, the Manifesto 
released by the National Committee of Military Veterans on 1 May 2010 
marked the first infringement of the “red lines” that had spared the Palace 
from direct criticism until then. In the wake of regional uprisings, street 
protests started to mount in January 2011 with youth activists, leftists, 
nationalists and the Islamist movement demanding political change. The 
leaders of JPMC employees' movement took the decision to launch the sit-in 
in this context. The latter were certainly inspired by the on-going events. 
Yet the organisation of JPMC employees’ protests in the midst of the 
popular uprising was not self-evident. The context in itself does not explain 
why JPMC employees took to the street with their colleagues. They did so 
because their shared experience in the workplace constituted the common 
ground through which they related to the slogans and grievances shouted out 
by other protesters. Ordinary people construe and construct their 
understandings of the state through lived experiences and through the 
narratives about the state and their rules.
20
 Beyond the matrimonial ties, the 
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narrative of corruption surrounding the privatisation of JPMC and the 
employees' daily encounters with management practices were instrumental 
in forging the employees' representation of a homogeneous ruling elite 
crippled by corruption, from among which Walid el Kurdi was only an 
example.  
Two dimensions of JPMC employees’ lived experiences found 
particular resonance in the “Arab Springs.” First, like many other 
Jordanians, they dared to take to the streets to protest in 2011 because they 
considered the nizâm (lit. regime or system; it usually refers to the ruling 
regime or the state) weakened. This belief was reinforced by the fact that, 
unlike previous labour protests and strikes, the labour protests were not 
violently disrupted in 2011. In Jordan, the possibilities for labour protests 
are restricted by the tight legal and security controls over labour. Jordanian 
law requires the workers to express their demands through the trade unions 
only. Since the 1970s, however, the official trade union structure had more 
often served to hamper labour protests than as a voice to raise employees’ 
concerns.
21
 Beyond institutional and legal constraints, JPMC employees 
also felt insecure to talk inside the workplace. As one employee explained to 
me: “Kurdi was a very strong man and he is the husband of the Princess... 
So, no one can talk, really!” The connection between the head of the 
company and the ruling regime nourished fears among the employees. In 
this context, not only JPMC employees’ protest demands, but the act of 
protesting itself, challenged the company’s management rationale. For many 
employees, the sit-in held in front of the headquarters in April 2011 broke 
the “wall of fear” that prevailed in the workplace. The employees did not 
express their grievances before 2011 because the institutional constraints, 
the authoritarian nature of management practices in JPMC and the 
connection to the King prevented them from doing so. In this context, the 
“Arab Spring” effect provided them the opportunity to voice their demands 
by relieving the fear of punishment. 
Moreover, the employees identified their struggle with the “Arab 
Springs” because, beyond the claims against corruption and favouritism, 
they were challenging the establishment. This transpired at two levels. First, 
they defied Walid el Kurdi himself. Under the pressure of the protests, 
Walid el Kurdi left the company in March 2012 and was tried for corruption 
in June 2013. For the leaders of the ITUP, toppling the head of the company 
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was their revolution. Second, they challenged the official trade union 
structure and the control of the General Intelligence Department over labour 
organisation by establishing the first independent labour union in the 
phosphate sector. Unlike other parts of Jordanian civil society, labour 
representation did not benefit from the relative political liberalisation after 
1989.
22
 In the mining sector more specifically, the GTUMME was regarded 
as crippled by corruption and the co-optation of its leaders. It was 
increasingly cut-off from the employees' daily concerns. This perception 
was solidified in April 2011 when the president of the GTUMME decided to 
stand on the side of the managers during negotiations. The official union’s 
illegitimacy in the eyes of employees facilitated the establishment of the 
independent union. On Labour Day 2011, the leaders of the independent 
union in the phosphate sector joined labour activists from other sectors 
including daily-workers in agricultural sector, electricity sector, 
municipalities, printing industry and medical industry among others to 
announce the establishment of the Federation of the Independent Labour 
Unions. The labour activists soon got drawn into another struggle whose 
scope extended beyond the workplace, namely the struggle for the right to 
pluralism and freedom of association for labour. In JPMC, the employees' 
protests turned into a competition between the two unions over the claim for 
legitimacy to represent the employees. 
Therefore, the protests of JPMC employees can be seen as a 
manifestation of the “Arab Spring” effect in two respects. Not only did the 
“Arab Spring” enable the protests by reducing a sense of fear, but it also 
provided the frame of reference in which the employees embedded their 
struggle, namely the struggle against corruption and authoritarian rules. 
During the general strikes in 2011 and 2012, favouritism, wâstah and 
corruption were the rallying cry. These three words encapsulate the sense of 
unfairness shared by employees. JPMC employees, however, did not all 
share the same views regarding what constituted fair treatment. In the 
following section, I discuss two contrasting views prevalent among 
employees. The first one, which was expressed by the leaders of the sit-in 
and their followers, alludes to meritocratic values whereas the second one 
emphasises the fairer distribution of wealth and opportunities. 
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3. Diverging moralities, diverging aspirations: tensions between 
meritocracy and equal allocation of wealth 
Diverging moralities of employment 
The initiative for the sit-in came from a small group of employees 
who used to sit together in one of their offices to kill time. Among the four 
who took the lead, three were engineers and one was a geologist by training 
who had been working as an IT expert since the late 1990s. Besides 
religious differences (they are Muslim and Christian), the instigators of the 
sit-in shared similar backgrounds. Originally from the northern part of 
Jordan, highly educated, they belonged to the urban middle class. As 
members of their respective professional associations, each had previous 
experiences in collective action. Some were politically close to the Trans-
Jordanian nationalist left, yet in 2011 they made the strategic choice to keep 
the independent labour movement distant from any political label. Each of 
them joined the company in the early 1990s working together in the 
Shyiddyieh mine. They were transferred to the headquarters at different 
times after the privatisation. At JPMC, transfer from the field to Amman is 
usually regarded a promotion. For the four employees, however, it was a 
disappointment as they were appointed to a position that did not meet their 
skills. In 2011, they were all posted to the exploration department where 
they had nothing to do. Nasim
23
 was one of the engineers who led the 
protests. When I asked him about his personal motivations to launch the sit-
in, he told me: “We can’t take our salaries for doing nothing!” “The right to 
work,” he continued, “is a matter of dignity!” In JPMC, there had always 
been employees who worked and others who did not. After the privatisation, 
however, it became a matter of contention for those who felt excluded from 
their previous tasks. These frustrations pointed to a certain morality of 
employment. “Some people don't want to work. But others, without job they 
can't find themselves, they lose their confidence. Now I can't imagine how I 
would be able work again.”24 This is the testimony of one of the employees 
who took part in the sit-in in April 2011. Like the four leaders of the 
protests, she had been appointed to a position where she had nothing to do. 
In this testimony, she expressed her desire to work. For her, working was a 
means of achieving personal fulfilment. In JPMC, this view was more 
widely shared among the skilled employees, including high and low skills, 
who took (or used to take) part in JPMC activities. Moreover, among my 
interlocutors, those who were compelled to work long hours did not 
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complain about the workload itself, but rather about the lack of recognition 
of their hard work. They denounced the fact that some employees who did 
nothing were promoted to higher positions whereas others who had worked 
hard were not rewarded. When they described what they believed the 
company should be, they usually refered to meritocratic values. For them, 
the company should hire, promote and allocate rewards based on the 
qualification, experience and commitment of an employee. This view builds 
upon a certain idea of modernity as the rational, technocratic and democratic 
organisation of the workplace. It is possible to trace the genealogy of 
concepts regarding modernity in Jordan back, at least, to the establishment 
of the Emirate of Transjordan in the 1920s when the supporters of 
parliamentary rule were opposing the chieftaincy-like ruling practices of the 
King.
25
 
This meritocratic ethic of employment stood in sharp contrast with 
another ethic, equally shared among JPMC employees, which saw 
employment as a form of wealth distribution. In this perspective, 
employment was not necessarily linked to work. Employees who grew up in 
the mining basin more often, but not always, expressed this view. The 
prevalence of this morality of employment among JPMC employees has to 
be seen in relation to recruitment practices in which access to jobs was not 
necessarily tied to qualification and where managerial practices did not 
force employees into work. This morality of employment, however, was not 
specific to JPMC employees. Like the meritocratic one, the morality of 
employment as a form of wealth distribution emerged from the historical 
trajectory of the Jordanian modern state. Its origins can be traced back to 
recruitment practices in the army and in the public sector that served to 
enforce the authority of the ruling regime over the population. This was 
particularly significant in southern Jordan where the public sector reached 
up to 90% of total employment in the late 1980s.
26
 These practices have 
shaped the morality of employment in two ways. First, the experience of 
employment was disconnected from hard work and effort. It was rather 
perceived as a means to secure income and to be entitled to several rights. 
Second, public employment sustained a certain type of rulers-ruled 
relationship by which the state sought to induct the population into the 
system of wage labour and thereby introduce economic dependency on the 
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public sector. In this perspective, employment as distribution represented a 
“relation of explicit hierarchy”27 between the rulers and ruled that created 
certain obligations for the rulers based on habits and customs.
28
 For 
employees who shared this morality of employment, the motivations to join 
the strikes were different from those expressed by the protest leaders. They 
did not want to overhaul the management system, but rather to seek further 
benefits from JPMC.  
The divide between “those who shared a meritocratic morality of 
employment” and “those who saw employment as a form of wealth 
distribution” in many ways maps onto the sociological divide between the 
“urban northerners” – considered to embody modernity – and the “Bedouin 
southerners” – considered to embody tradition.29 This overlapping mirrors 
the fact that JPMC was, to a certain extent, the receptacle of tensions that 
shaped Jordanian society more broadly. But JPMC was not solely the 
receptacle of these tensions. The “urban northerners” / “Bedouin 
southerners” divide, which is the most common key for reading Jordanian 
politics, cannot account for the numerous employees who stand as 
exceptions to this determinism. As a matter of fact, the proponents of the 
meritocratic morality of employment were actually found among employees 
who belonged to tribal families from the South whereas many of the “urban 
northerners” felt threatened by the demands for a meritocratic system. 
Furthermore, the divide between those who shared a meritocratic morality 
of employment and those who saw employment as a form of wealth 
distribution did not match with the hierarchical organisation of JPMC. Both 
views were shared by employees at all levels of the labour organisation, 
from the workers to the engineers and managers. 
Looked at it more closely, the divide between employees along the 
two moralities of employment can better be explained by the divide between 
the employees who were qualified for their job (low-skilled and high-skilled 
alike) and those who were not. The former aspired to work and to be 
rewarded in accordance with their labour. The latter, however, had little to 
contribute to the performance of the company. There would be no place for 
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them in a meritocratic system. They could nonetheless justify their position 
in JPMC based on the mutual expectations between the rulers and the rules 
with respect to subsistence. This suggests that the divide among JPMC 
employees, between those who aspired to a meritocratic system and those 
who viewed employment as distribution of wealth, did not reproduce the 
identity divide between Southerners and Northerners, but was rather 
“manufactured” in the workplace. It reflected the divide between the skilled 
and the unskilled employees. By allowing some employees not to work 
while compelling others to work for long hours, the management system 
made possible and, to some extent, encouraged the coexistence of two 
opposite moralities of employment among JPMC employees.  
 
Different interpretations of the consequences of the privatisation 
The tension between the meritocratic morality of employment and 
the one that regarded employment as a form of wealth distribution was 
further increased by the consequences of privatisation. On the one hand, the 
experience of privatisation further increased the frustrations of the 
employees who shared meritocratic values. Privatisation was not a mere 
transfer of capital from governments to private investors. It also entailed 
certain notions of how private companies should function, including the 
rationalisation of the labour process, technification, profit maximization and 
heavy workload. This idea was well embedded in the minds of JPMC 
employees. The project of the privatisation raised fears for the employees 
who worried for their rights and entitlements; but it also raised hopes for 
those who were aspiring to a more rationalised mode of management. 
Contrary to employees’ expectations, however, the privatisation of JPMC 
did not lead to an increase in work pressure. On the contrary, many 
departments were deprived of their productive activities. While privatisation 
did not introduce substantial material and managerial changes to the 
company, it widened the gap between the employees’ lived experience in 
the workplace and their notion of how things should be. 
On the other hand, the privatisation of JPMC reinforced the 
economic exclusion of the population living in the mining area. If JPMC 
employees were not personally affected, those who grew up in the mining 
area shared the opinion that the company should further support their 
community. In this respect, employment was a key issue. While JPMC used 
to be the primary employer of the population living in the mining area, the 
company stopped hiring among this population after 2000. The victims of 
this decision were not the employees themselves, but their sons and relatives 
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who struggled to find a decent job. As mentioned above, the employment 
relation in JPMC used to sustain a relation of explicit hierarchy between the 
sovereign and the local population. From the Maussian perspective, this 
means that through privatisation JPMC sought to absolve itself from 
obligations stemming from the tradition of hiring the local population. This 
tradition refered to the rulers-ruled relationship and, thus, this obligation 
would stand annulled as soon as the rulers step out from the company’s 
ownership. For the local population, however, the company was still under 
the control of the ruling regime. In other words, they considered that the 
privatisation of JPMC did not disengage the company from its obligation. 
The employee resentment was further fuelled by the fact that, despite the 
closure of the regular recruitment process, Walid al-Kurdi did nevertheless 
appoint a few hundred employees between 2006 and 2011. Moreover, 
during 2008 and 2010, the profits of JPMC skyrocketed as the result of the 
sudden peak in phosphate market prices.
30
 While newspapers were reporting 
the excellent results of their company, employees found it increasingly 
unfair that Walid el Kurdi earnt millions while themselves and their families 
remained poor. 
 
Diverging aspirations and further challenges for the JPMC 
employees’ movement 
Employees’ expectations regarding the outcome of the strikes reflect 
the different moralities of employment and different interpretations of the 
privatisation. Like the four leaders of the movement, many employees went 
to the streets to request the complete restructuring of the company. They 
prioritised implementing new by-laws, restructuring the organisational chart 
to cancel redundant positions and revising the human resources management 
system based on meritocratic values. Those who saw employment as a form 
of wealth distribution, however, did not want to reform the management 
system. They hoped to obtain higher salaries and, eventually, a job for their 
sons. Besides these two contentious groups, JPMC employees also included 
a minority group that decided to stand on the side of the managers. These 
included employees who had long been co-opted by the establishment, such 
as the active members of the GTUMME, as well as employees who believed 
in order and hierarchy. Hence, the politics of the workplace in JPMC cannot 
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be reduced to the struggle between owners and workers. On the contrary, 
the mobilisation of JPMC employees suggests that the divide between the 
two moralities of employment discussed in this article (meritocracy vs. 
allocation of wealth) superimposed a further division on those already 
imposed by virtue of the hierarchical organisation of labour. This explains 
how high-qualified employees – who would be expected to occupy 
managing positions such as engineers and geologists – could become 
leaders of the employees' movement in 2011.  
This divide constituted the major weakness of JPMC employees' 
movement. In February 2012, after the second general strike, the leaders of 
the independent union had strong legitimacy among the employees whereas 
the president of the GTUMME, Khaled Zaher Fanatseh, was completely 
discredited. They had just reached an agreement with the head of the 
company.
31
 This agreement was seen as the most generous collective 
agreement in the history of JPMC. The leaders of the independent union 
were aware that the restructuring of JPMC would not be sufficient incentive 
to rally all the employees and, thus, they had also included a set of financial 
and material benefits to their demands. The agreement thus included three 
sets of clauses. The first set of clauses was related to the restructuring of the 
company and met the initial demands of the strike leaders. The second set of 
clauses included financial and social benefits for the employees including an 
increase in wages, a 16th month of salary, the raising of the end-of-service 
allowance, scholarships and the extension of health insurance after 
retirement among other benefits. The last set of demands was related to the 
establishment of an early-retirement scheme, known as the hawâfez 2012. 
This was not part of the initial demands of the employees, but appeared in 
the outcome of the negotiations.  
Two years later, in May 2014, JPMC witnessed a new general strike. 
This time, however, the strike was not led by the independent union but by 
Khaled Zaher Fanatseh, the president of the GTUMME! The latter rallied 
the employees against the restructuring plan and the new personnel system 
that were put in place by the company as part of the requirements of the 
agreement of February 14, 2012. To end the strike, the company decided to 
withdraw the changes recently introduced. In the meantime, it pulled the rug 
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from under the feet of the independent union and secured the status quo 
within the company. 
 
Conclusion  
Based on the assumption that contentious politics is grounded in the 
everyday life of workers, this article analyses the rationale behind the 
mobilisation of JPMC employees in 2011. It discusses the claims of the 
protestors in light of the employees' lived experiences of the workplace. In 
the context of the Arab uprisings, like many other Jordanians, the employees 
of JPMC united against corruption, favouritism and the authoritarian rules. 
More specifically, they protested against the privatisation of their company 
that brought an individual closely related to the Hashemite monarchy to the 
head of JPMC. In this context, the “Arab Spring” effect played the role of 
catalysing the protests and provided a common frame of reference for 
demonstrators. Behind shared feelings of unfairness, however, JPMC 
employees were divided between those who hoped for a management 
system based on meritocratic values on the one hand, and those who asked 
for a larger share in wealth allocation on the other hand. These contrasting 
aspirations reflected divergent moralities of employment: one viewed 
employment as a medium for personal achievement through work, whereas 
the other considered employment as a form of wealth distribution. This 
divide was also manifest in the way employees interpreted the consequences 
of the privatisation: for the former the privatisation widened the gap 
between their expectations and the reality while the latter denounced the 
increasing economic exclusion of the poorest.  
The study of the mobilisation of JPMC employees, thus, shows that 
the politics of JPMC was structured around the broad divide between the 
logics of meritocracy and the logics of wealth distribution rather than 
around the workers/owners divide. This has important consequences for the 
study of labour movements as it forces us to question the meaning(s) of 
employment that underlie labour demands. Moreover, in light of the latter 
development of JPMC employees’ mobilisation, the coexistence of different 
moralities of employment in the workplace appeared as its major weakness. 
It hampered the possibilities of the emergence of working-class 
consciousness. In this respect, the case of JPMC employees provides some 
insights into the non-making of the Jordanian working-class. Finally, the 
origins of the meritocracy/wealth distribution divide can be partly explained 
by the socio-historical trajectory of the Jordanian state. It reflected tensions 
between modernisation policies and chieftaincy-like ruling practices that 
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have shaped Jordanian politics since the establishment of the modern state. 
The demands of JPMC employees suggest that ideas of modernity and 
chieftaincy-like ruling practices penetrated spheres of the social life beyond 
the realm of the state by shaping the way ordinary people related to the 
world they live in.  
Sociologically, however, the divide between those who shared a 
meritocratic morality of employment and those who regarded employment 
as a form of wealth distribution cannot be reduced to the “urban northerner” 
/ “Bedouin southerner” cleavage commonly invoked to explain Jordan 
politics. Even though the two often overlap, there were many exceptions 
among JPMC employees. The article argues that the dynamics in the 
workplace better account for the employees’ divide along the two different 
moralities of employment. Empirically, the meritocratic morality of 
employment was widely supported among the qualified employees (low-
skilled and high-skilled employees alike) whereas employees who were 
poorly qualified shared the morality of employment as a form of wealth 
distribution. This divide can be traced back to recruitment and managerial 
practices that allowed for a large proportion of employees to not work in 
JPMC. This means that the meritocracy/wealth distribution divide in JPMC 
was manufactured in the workplace itself. In this respect, the study of JPMC 
can contribute to a better understanding of Jordanian politics by showing 
how the cleavage between the “urban northerners” and the “Bedouin 
southerners,” which is usually construed as an identity-based cleavage (and 
which, in relation to work, often alludes to the myth of the “lazy Bedouin”), 
is (re)produced in the workplace. 
 
 From Kafr al-Dawwar to Kharga’s ‘Desert Hell Camp’: the 
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ntroduction 
“On November the 4th, at dawn, policemen and members of the secret 
police… broke suddenly in the room of my father’s apartment in which I 
was sleeping. Major Achoub threw me out of bed and started his inquiry… 
‘You are a communist, a traitor to the country. Me, an officer of the army 
will show you what you deserve…’”.1 So begins the letter from an unnamed 
“young comrade” in Cairo’s Central Prison. It was 1953, and the first wave 
of post-revolutionary repression against the communist movement was in 
full swing. All political parties were forcefully dissolved by the 
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) on January 18, 1953. A month 
before the RCC passed a law abolishing the right to strike, just months after 
a large-strike had erupted at Kafr al-Dawwar, which the Free Officers dealt 
with harshly.
2
 They hoped by repressing independent political elements, 
especially communist organizers of trade union movements, it would 
facilitate the fostering of economic and political relations with the United 
States. Thus, the property of all parties, especially offices and printing 
presses, were confiscated and leaders of political parties were arrested and 
put under house arrest pending trial.
3
 
                                                 
1
 Letter, “Letter from a young comrade sent from Cairo’s Central Prison,” folder 159, 
Egyptian Communists in Exile (Rome Group), International Institute of Social History. 
Unless otherwise noted, all documents with folder numbers come from the same archives. 
My sincerest gratitude goes to the archivists at IISH, whose help was immensely valuable.  
2
 Newsletter, Solidarity, October 1959, 5, folder 182. 
3
 ABDEL-MALEK, Anour. Egypt: Military Society – The Army Regime, the Left, and 
Social Change under Nasser. New York: Random House, 1968, p. 91; MOHI EL-DIN, 
Khaled. Memories of a Revolution. Cairo: American University in Cairo, 1995, pp. 136-7. 
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 The Egyptian monarchy, installed by the British, was quickly and 
bloodlessly swept from power in July, 1952 by an ideologically diverse but 
largely middle-class cadre of military officers. In the years preceding the 
coup the legitimacy of the monarchy had continually declined as concession 
after concession was made to the British occupiers. The Free Officers, as 
they came to be known, ran the gamut ideologically and included a fiery 
mix of Egyptian nationalists, members of the Muslim Brothers (Al-Ikhwaan 
al-Muslimeen), communists and fellow travelers, quasi-fascists who had 
admired the Axis powers, and pro-American elements.
4
 The group was 
organized largely through the secret labor of Gamal Abd Al-Nasser, who 
had flirted with nearly every conceivable organization and ideology 
throughout the 1940s and early 1950s. Acting first as the nexus through 
which the officers came together, Nasser eventually assumed the foremost 
role within the RCC, outmaneuvering the relatively popular Mohammed 
Naguib, who was a last-minute addition to the Free Officer plot meant to 
maintain control and discipline over the military in the post-coup era. The 
RCC guided Egypt during the tumultuous period after the revolution, and 
proved to be a constant site of struggle between the two major personalities, 
Nasser and Naguib. This lasted until March 1954, when Nasser took the 
reins of power. Despite their differences, both Naguib and Nasser largely 
converged from the outset on the necessity of stomping out independent 
communist activity. Naguib was adamant that “from the very first we had 
done everything that was necessary in order to eliminate the chief causes of 
Communism in Egypt, namely, a corrupt monarchy, an unjust system of 
landownership, the general contempt for the rights of workers, and the hated 
foreign occupation”.5 Nasser’s formula for dealing with labor accented 
Naguib’s formulation: “The workers don’t demand; we give”.6  
Under the RCC, dozens of left-wing militants were rounded up 
during 1953, most to be tried by the ad hoc revolutionary tribunals 
established by the ruling officers. On January 18 alone, security forces 
                                                 
4
 The left was represented by Khaled Mohi-al-Din, a sympathizer of the communist 
movement, and Youssef Siddique, a member of the communist DMNL. Of those who were 
most explicitly pro-American and business-oriented in their foreign and economic policy 
approach was ‘Abd al-Mun‘im Amin. Many of the Free Officers were less ideologically 
and politically tied to the United States, but were more than willing to work with them to 
meet desired goals. Thus, Nasser and others were obstinate that any references to “Anglo-
American” imperialism, common in the communist lexicon at the time, be removed from 
Free Officer materials.  
5
 ABDEL-MALEK, Anour. Egypt: Military Society…Op.Cit., p. 96. 
6
 POSUSNEY, Marsha Pripstein. Labor and the State in Egypt: Workers, Unions, and 
Economic Restructuring. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 73-4. 
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rounded up 101 political leaders, 48 of them communists.
7
 On August 10, 
1953, state security forces arrested twenty-one leaders of the Democratic 
Movement for National Liberation (DMNL), and in December fifty more 
members were arrested.
8
 In early November, the leaders of the umbrella 
National Democratic Front, spearheaded by communists like Ahmed Taha, 
were also arrested. As Gamal Abd Al-Nasser was maneuvering his way into 
power at Naguib’s expense in the spring of 1954, some 254 leftists were 
arrested and sent to prison camps. Sixteen leftist officers were removed 
from duty.
9
 Both the Free Officers who had been most sympathetic to the 
communist cause, Khaled Mohi el-Din and Youssef Siddique, faced 
repression as well. On November 8 of that year, some thirty people were 
arrested for belonging to the Egyptian Communist Party.
10
 In April of 1955 
Nasser ordered the arrest of thirty leading leftists who were interned at the 
Abu Zaabal prison camp.
11
 By the first half of 1955, the Communist Party 
of Israel suggested that some 750 communists were imprisoned in Cairo 
alone.
12
 This first wave of repression was aimed at crushing the vociferous 
labor movement led in large part by communist workers. 
 The following article attempts to articulate a detailed account of the 
two periods of repression targeting the communist movement under Nasser. 
After a brief glimpse at working- class communist militancy prior to the 
July revolution, the first major section explores the limited demographic 
data available on communist prisoners in Egypt during the first period of 
repression from 1952 to 1956. The importance of the demographic data lies 
in the social and economic base of the prisoners; a significant portion can be 
identified as working class. Following a brief period of cooptation (July 
1956 to December 1958), the next major section returns again to the 
demographic evidence available during the second period of repression. 
This period extends from January 1959 to April 1965, when the communists 
dissolved their organizations. This data suggests a decrease in the 
percentage of communist prisoners who are identifiable as working class. 
                                                 
7
 BEININ, Joel and LOCKMAN, Zachary. Workers on the Nile: Nationalism, Communism, 
Islam and the Egyptian Working Class, 1882-1954. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University, 
1987, p. 433; EL-DIN. Memories. Op.Cit., p. 146. 
8
 ISMAEL, TAREQ Y.  and EL-SA’ID, Rifa‘at. The Communist Movement in Egypt, 1920-
1988. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1990, p. 75. At the time the DMNL was 
the largest communist organization in Egypt. 
9
 ABDEL-MALEK, Anour. Egypt: Military Society…Op.Cit., p. 96. 
10
 Report, “Conditions De Vie Dans Les Prisons D’Egypte,” Folder 167. 
11
 ABDEL-MALEK, Anour. Egypt: Military Society…Op.Cit., p. 105. 
12
 BEININ, Joel. “The Communist Movement and Nationalist Political Discourse in 
Nasirist Egypt”. The Middle East Journal. vol. 41, no. 4, Autumn 1987, p.575. 
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Although this episode in Egyptian communist history is important in 
its own historical right, it also is increasingly pertinent to reflect upon in the 
aftermath of Abdel Fatah al-Sisi’s ascension to power in July 2013. While 
the Egyptian left continues to struggle with the appropriate relationship 
between nationalism and communism, a resurgence of nationalism has taken 
place under Sisi’s reign over the last two years which has been once again 
resulted in both repression of the independent left and the cooptation of the 
traditional communists. This is especially true within a framework of anti-
Ikhwaan sentiment amongst significant elements of the Egyptian left. 
However, it is likely that dissolution into Sisi’s nationalist-military political 
project would prove even more disastrous for the left than it was under 
Nasser. Not all segments of the left have followed this path, however. After 
a brief period of flirting with the idea of a “third way” between the military 
and Ikhwaan, the Revolutionary Socialists have recently advanced an 
invitation to the Muslim Brothers to form a united front against the military 
government.
13
 Given the political nature of both the Muslim Brothers and 
the brief presidency of Mohammed Morsi, this is a strategy ripe with risk as 
well. Whatever happens next, the lessons of the Egyptian communist 
movement from the Nasser years are more relevant than ever. 
 
Labor Militancy before July 1952 
Prior to the 1952 revolution, Egyptian society had been partially 
destabilized in the post-World War II era by a series of strikes and 
nationalist demonstrations. In the immediate post-war period the National 
Committee of Workers and Students (NCWS, al-Lagna al-Wataniyya li’l-
‘Ummal wa’l-Talaba) was formed on February 18 and 19, 1946 to channel 
both class-based and nationalist demands.
14
 Representatives from the 
General Nationalist Committee of Shubra el-Kheima workers, Cairo tram 
workers, printers, the Congress of Private Sector Trade Unions, the 
Preparatory Committee for an Egyptian Trade Union Congress, and the 
Association of Egyptian Working Women, among others, were present. 
                                                 
13
 See both “Egyptian socialists say ‘third way’ has crumbled amid uptick in attacks,” 
Middle East Eye, July 28, 2015, http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/egyptian-socialists-
say-third-way-has-crumbled-amid-uptick-violent-attacks-1085613474 as well as 
“Brotherhood agrees to form a revolutionary front with socialists,” Middle East Monitor, 
July 31, 2015, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/africa/20151-brotherhood-agrees-
to-form-a-revolutionary-front-with-socialists. 
14
 The NCWS was formed after the Egyptian army opened fire on the students as they 
attempted to cross ‘Abbas Bridge and demand King Farouk stop negotiating with the 
British. See Beinin and Lockman, pp. 340-1. 
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Within days they had called for a general strike labeled “Evacuation Day.” 
Up to 100,000 workers and students demonstrated, of which 23 were killed 
by security forces and hundreds more were wounded.
15
 The formation of the 
NCWS challenged both the Wafd and the Muslim Brotherhood for 
nationalist leadership, and augmented leftist presence within the nationalist 
leadership. 
A series of attempts to establish trade union unity were also present 
during this period, most notably the Preparatory Committee for a General 
Federation of Egyptian Trade Unions (PCGFETU, al-Lajna al-Tahdiriyya 
li’l-Ittihad al-‘Amm li-Niqabat ‘Ummal Misr). The DMNL initiated the 
formation of the committee in 1951 with Ahmad Taha acting as its general 
secretary. As Joel Beinin notes, the PCGFETU assumed “the dual character 
of a trade union federation and an expression of working class 
nationalism”.16 Tareq Ismael and Rifa‘at El Sa‘id contend that the 
PCGFETU represented some 65,000 workers in over a hundred unions, 
roughly half of all unionized workers during that period.
17
 Due to its 
gravitas in the formation of the federation, the DMNL and its cadre were 
“unquestionably the leading force in the trade union movement in 1951”.18 
Furthermore, by this period workers were prominent in the communist 
leadership: Ahmed Taha, Anwar Makkaar, Muhammed Shatta, and 
Muhammed Ali Amer. Through both the NCWS and the PCGFETU, 
communist influence and leadership represented one of the primary sources 
of independent political leadership during this period. 
 
The first wave of repression: Kafr al-Dawwar to the Suez Crisis, 
1952-6 
By late July 1952, the Free Officers were desperately grasping 
anywhere they could for both legitimacy and foreign capital. One week after 
the coup Law No. 138 from 1947 was adjusted, reducing a requirement 
stipulating that  corporations be composed of 51 percent Egyptian capital to 
only 49 percent, allowing foreign capital a majority share.
19
 Securing 
                                                 
15
 BEININ, Joel and LOCKMAN, Zachary. Workers on the Nile…Op.Cit., pp. 341-2. 
16
 Ibid., pp. 408-9. 
17
 ISMAEL, TAREQ Y.  and EL-SA’ID, Rifa‘at. The Communist Movement in Egypt. 
Op.Cit., p. 70.  
18
 Conversely, the “influence of the communists in the nationalist movement was not as 
broad as it was in 1946” at the time of the NCWS, in large part because of the 1948 
Palestine partition decision, discussed below. See BEININ, Joel and LOCKMAN, Zachary. 
Workers on the Nile…Op.Cit., pp. 406-7. 
19
 ABDEL-MALEK, Anour. Egypt: Military Society…Op.Cit.,pp. 88-9. 
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American aid was one of the primary goals in the immediate post-
revolutionary period. During his stay in prison, the unnamed young comrade 
mentioned earlier recalls how the Military Police explained to him that the 
communists “had been arrested to pay the price for american [sic] aid”.20 
The last thing the governing officers desired was independent, uncontrolled 
labor agitation, even if it contained within it nationalist aspirations or 
support for the revolution. The captain in charge of the inquiry threatened to 
send the prisoner to the Revolutionary Tribunal, which had been established 
in February 1953, if he did not “confess everything”. To the questioner the 
young comrade was accused of being a “dirty sionist, homosexual, son of a 
dog, etc”.21 The captain extolled the prisoner to “be thankful to god… that 
you are under 20 years of age, otherwise we would have hanged you”. The 
threat was not entirely empty, as the two strike leaders from Kafr al-
Dawwar, Mustafa Khamis and Mohammad Hasan al-Baqari, were hung for 
their involvement. 
On August 12, just weeks after the Free Officers had assumed 
power, a strike at Kafr al-Dawwar became the first test for the new rulers. 
The small industrial city located some thirty kilometers from Alexandria 
was composed of two large textile factories, with some ten thousand 
workers at the Misr Fine Spinning and Weaving Company, the site of the 
strike. Immediately clashes occurred between the workers and the police, 
and finally the army was called in to quell the strike, ending in the death of a 
number of workers and two soldiers. Hundreds were injured.
22
 Ironically, 
the workers had declared their strike “in the name of Muhammed Naguib 
and the revolution,” yet it was Naguib himself who was adamant that the 
workers be dealt with harshly.
23
 Both Khamis and el-Baqari were accused of 
being communists and a kangaroo court sentenced both leaders to death. 
Khamis and al-Baqari were executed by the military government on 
September 7, 1952. Khamis’ dying words were, “I am wronged, I want a 
retrial”.24 
Naguib was adamant that “from the very first we had done 
everything that was necessary in order to eliminate the chief causes of 
Communism in Egypt, namely, a corrupt monarchy, an unjust system of 
                                                 
20
 Letter, “Letter from a young comrade,” p. 3. 
21
 Ibid., p. 1. Despite having opposed Zionism ideologically throughout much of the first 
half of the 20
th
 century, the Egyptian communist movement, following the Soviet line in 
1948, overwhelmingly accepted the 1947 partition plan for Palestine-Israel. 
22
 Newsletter, Solidarity, October 1959, folder 182. 
23
 BOTMAN, Selma. The Rise of Egyptian Communism, 1939-1970. Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 1988, p. 126. 
24
 BEININ, Joel and LOCKMAN, Zachary. Workers on the Nile…Op.Cit., p. 423. 
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landownership, the general contempt for the rights of workers, and the hated 
foreign occupation”.25 What Naguib fails to mention is that despite the 
hand-outs from above, it took an immense amount of state repression to 
smash the influence of the communists. In September of 1954, twenty four 
high profile communists, including Ahmad Taha, were sent to a 
Revolutionary Tribunal and all but three were charged with propagating 
communism. All together the twenty one defendants were sentenced to 101 
years of forced labor and fined 1800 Egyptian pounds.
 
One month later, in 
November, 30 members of the Egyptian Communist Party were arrested. In 
July 1955 the government brought 21 DMNL leaders to trial for the crime of 
desiring to establish in Egypt a “social plan” similar to the Soviet model. 
Another eight military officers were accused of having relations with the 
organization.
26
 One detailed report from the period suggests around 550 
communists were being held in various prisons and concentration camps. 
This number did not include those who had been deported to the Kharga 
desert camp.
27
 
Although 550 is a nominally smaller figure in relation to other 
organizations targeted during this period, such as the Muslim Brothers, it 
represents a much higher ratio of imprisoned communists relative to their 
strength. Nasser himself estimated that in 1956 there were “almost five 
thousand Communists in Egypt”.28 Joel Beinin, citing figures provided by 
“several former communists,” suggests that in July of 1952 the DMNL had 
around 2,000 members, Workers’ Vangaurd another 300, and al-Raya 
(associated with Fouad Morsi) had yet another 100, totaling half the figure 
Nasser presumed.
29
 Walter Laqueur is more generous, citing a total of 7,000 
communists in 1954.
30
 As the largest organization of communists in Egypt, 
the DMNL bore the brunt of repression during this period.  
According to one report documenting the biographical data of some 
42 arrestees, a third of the communists were workers, including five textile 
workers, three mechanics, a carpenter, and a shoemaker, among others. 
Although students and traditional middle class elements formed most of the 
remaining communists, it is clear that by 1953 communists had made 
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26
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Nasirist Egypt”. Op.Cit., pp. 573-4. 
30
 LAQUER, Walter Z. Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East. New York: 
Praeger, 1957, p. 50. 
Derek Alan Ide 57 
 
Workers of the World, Volume I, Number 7, November 2015 
 
significant inroads in many working class communities and trades. The 
Daily Worker reports that in September of 1953 some 800 workers were 
arrested at Shurbagi’s mills in Shubra el-Kheima.31 These statistics, though 
not conclusive, suggest first that during this period the communist 
movement had a large working-class cadre and general working-class 
support. 
Walter Laqueur could be considered half correct in 1956 when he 
proclaimed that “The Communist movement in Egypt never was (nor is it 
not at the time of writing) a working-class movement…”32 Prior to World 
War II, the communist movement had never established a mass working 
class base, but by 1952 at the time of the coup and immediately after, the 
communists had transcended their insular status, recruited vital working 
class cadre into positions of leadership, and secured a relatively large 
working-class membership and sphere of influence. Joel Beinin’s analysis 
of the class composition is more nuanced. He maintains that while the 
communists “did have significant working class support in the period 1952-
4, by the mid-1950s the university-educated intelligentsia was the most 
important component of the movement, especially at the leadership level”.33 
This “significant working class support” for the communists amongst the 
most politically active working-class elements meant that the communists 
were to receive the most vitriolic attacks during the first wave of repression. 
Some examples of those repressed include Sa‘id Khalil Turk, 
secretary-general of the transportation workers’ syndicate in 1952. Forty-
three year old Mohammed ‘Ali Amer, earlier the secretary of a branch of the 
Wafdist Youth and then president of the Textile Workers’ Union in 1947, 
was also arrested.
34
 Perhaps one of the most notable trade union leaders 
other than Ahmed Taha imprisoned during this period was Mohammed 
Shatta, a textile worker and member of the mechanical weaving syndicate of 
Shubra el-Kheima. Shatta was notably active in textile work at Mahalla el 
Kubra (1932-40) and Kafr al-Dawwar (1940-3) before arriving in Shubra el-
Kheima, all three historic sites of militant trade union struggle. He was a 
member of the NCWS as well as founder and secretary general of the 
General Committee of Shubra el-Kheima Workers where he helped lead a 
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45-day strike in early January of 1946, one of the longest strikes in Egyptian 
history up to that time.
35
  
In September of 1954, Ahmed Taha was one of the 21 communists 
sentenced to five years hard labor.
36
 Taha was a member of the Progressive 
Liberation Front (Al-Gabhat al-Tahrir al-Taqadomiyeh, or GAT), the 
relatively small splinter organization that broke off from the DMNL in 1948 
and rejoined the organization in 1950. He held a leading position on the 
DMNL’s Central Committee37 prior to his arrest in February of 1953 and he 
had previously been Chairman of the Committee of the Preparatory 
Congress of Unions of Middle Eastern Countries, a leader in the National 
Committee of Workers and Students, and the Egyptian delegate to the 
World Trade Union Federation. At the time of his imprisonment, one report 
listed Taha as 27 years old and in normal health.
38
 Before the military 
tribunal in 1954 Ahmad Taha made a courageous speech denouncing the 
“agents of Anglo-American imperialism”: 
The agents of Anglo-American imperialism want to keep me in 
prison because I defend the workers who have elected me and 
whose sacrifices and history struggles for the national cause fill 
me with pride… We remember with pride the work done by the 
National Committee of Workers and Students which led the 
demonstrations of February 21, 1945, as a result of which the 
imperialists had to pull out of the towns and remain in the Canal 
Zone… I represented the Egyptian workers at the meeting of the 
General Council of the World Federation of Trade Unions in 
1951. I shall never forget the message of solidarity which came 
to us from the peoples of Korea, Vietnam, and Iran… The 
improvement of the living conditions of the workers, protection 
against unemployment, sickness, and old-age require a national 
and popular economic policy, peaceful relations with all 
countries on the basis of equality, and the repudiation of the 
designs of U.S. imperialism.
39
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 Report, Untitled report documenting 42 political prisoners, folder 158. For information 
regarding the strike, in which some six hundred workers were arrested, see BEININ, Joel 
and LOCKMAN, Zachary. Workers on the Nile…Op.Cit., pp. 338-40.  
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 Report, Untitled report documenting 42 political prisoners. 
39
 Report, World Trade Union Movement, “The Courage and Dignity of Our Brothers,” 
January 1955, folder 285. 
Derek Alan Ide 59 
 
Workers of the World, Volume I, Number 7, November 2015 
 
In early June, 1955 Ahmed Taha and some 500 other prisoners
40
 
were deported to the prison camp “in the middle of the desert,” roughly 
twenty kilometers outside of Kharga Oasis.
41
 At least 60 of these were 
communists.
42
 Without too much hyperbole, the Daily Worker referred to it 
as “Desert Hell Camp,”43 giving an indication of the analysis by the 
international communist movement of the Nasser government during this 
period. 
The Kharga prison camp was administered directly by the army. 
Most of the prisoners had been condemned by military tribunals and 
sentenced to hard labor. One report suggested that “the terrible conditions 
under which they have to live put also their lives in danger”. These 
conditions included: twenty prisoners to a tent which did “not protect them 
either from the burning sun or from the sand storms,”44 one bucket of water 
per day for every twenty prisoners, low quality and insufficient food, a 
camp area infested with snakes and scorpions, and little to no medical 
care.
45
 Indeed, another communist prisoner who went by the initials “A. A.” 
explains that “mosquitos buzz and sting in daytime; scorpions and rats make 
a nightmarish ballet at night… food is scarce and disgusting enough to keep 
the prisoners alive until the next day. No visitors are allowed and no parcels 
may be sent by families”.46 The result of such horrendous living conditions 
was “chronic dysentery, violent headaches, widespread Asiatic flu, severe 
undernourishment”.47 A letter dated September of 1955 notes that Taha’s 
weight had dropped from 65 to 50 kilos, and that his “health has become so 
bad that he has been transported to the Tourah convicts hospital towards the 
end of June,” but that he had been “re-transferred, towards the middle of 
August, to Kharga’s camp, without having undergone any medical 
treatment”.48  A letter from Taha himself dated June 21, 1955 confirms this: 
“I am alright, but my health is deteriorating… You know well that the 
medical treatment is insufficient and even bad, but what to do?”49 Taha 
remained resilient, however, declaring: “Don’t worry about me, you know 
me well my friend, I will pass this crisis physically and morally 
                                                 
40
 Report, “The Deportation Camp of Kharga,” folder 155. 
41
 Letter about Ahmed Taha dated “Paris, 2nd September, 1955,” folder 76. 
42
 Report, “Conditions de Vie Dans Les Prisons D’Egypte,” folder 167, 
43
 Newspaper, “Egypt opens Desert Hell Camp,” Daily Worker, folder 284-5. 
44
 Report, “The Deportation Camp of Kharga,” folder 155. 
45
 Ibid. 
46
 Newspaper, “My Five Years in Nasser’s Desert Prison Camp,” Reynold News, April 26, 
1959, folder 176. 
47
 Ibid. 
48
 Letter about Ahmed Taha dated “Paris, 2nd September, 1955.” 
49
 Letter from Ahmed Taha dated “Cairo, 21st June, 1955,” folder 76. 
60 The repression of Communist workers in Egypt, 1952-1965 
 
 
successfully, because I love so many things, wider than our narrow 
world”.50  
 
The period of cooptation, 1956-8 
Although Taha himself did not have the opportunity to experience 
the brief respite from repression that other communists enjoyed, the period 
from mid-1956 until the end of 1958, known in much of the literature as the 
“Bandung Period,” was a time of relative relaxation for the communist 
movement as Nasser’s realpolitik gravitated towards the USSR. Yet, as 
Anouar Abdel-Malek maintains, it is impossible to stamp the Bandung 
conference (April 1955) as the end of repression for communists in Egypt. 
Economic talks with the United States over the Aswan High Dam continued 
until 1956. It was not until Egypt received the Czech arms deal, guarantee of 
Soviet funding for the Aswan High Dam, and the Suez Crisis that a period 
of cooptation and an easing of repression against the communist movement 
could occur.
51
 During this period many communists were released from 
prison. 
Not all were freed, however. A letter dated August 25, 1957 
explained that “all the internees held in concentration camps have been 
released, but… most of the convicted prisoners are still at Kharga Oasis 
Camp… and their material conditions are getting worse with the worsening 
of the general economic conditions in Egypt”.52 Another report from a 
month earlier cited many well-known communists in Kharga, including 
Ahmed Taha, Fouad Habashi, Mohammed Shatta, Zaki Mourad, and Sa‘id 
Khalil Turk, among others.
53
 A May 1957 letter written on behalf of 150 
communist prisoners addressed all voters, citizens, and candidates on the 
occasion of the upcoming electoral campaign: “some of us are in the Central 
Prison in Cairo, others in Tourah Prison, the vast majority has Kharga Oasis 
Prison”.54 Of the 73 communist prisoners known to be at Kharga, a sizeable 
number, almost a quarter (18), were listed as “workers”.55 Likewise, a well-
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known labor lawyer and communist Youssef Darwish
56
 was arrested in 
1957 after the government shut down his law office.
57
 As Joel Beinin 
explains, even during the period 1956-8 “there was never any chance that 
[Nasser] would legalize the communist organizations or permit them to 
establish an independent base of political power which might challenge his 
own rule”.58 Abdel-Malek confirms that as “early as the autumn of 1958, the 
machinery of repression and propaganda went into action, progressively 
increasing its pressure on the left… Trade union leaders were rearrested 
barely a year after they had been released from Abu Zaabal. The military 
tribunals resumed jurisdiction over Communist defendants”.59 Thus, the 
“Bandung Period” can only be understood as a period of openness in 
relation to the periods immediately preceding and following it. 
The independent trade-union movement had been largely subdued 
during this period. In its place the official, state-sanctioned Egyptian Trade 
Union Federation (ETUF) was established in 1957. The ETUF was a highly 
centralized structure whereby the higher the position in the bureaucracy the 
more state-screening the individual was exposed to. By 1961 the ETUF had 
nearly 346,000 members, and by 1964 it had nearly 1.3 million.
60
 Nasser 
likewise initiated top-down social reform for workers, increasing wages and 
benefits in exchange for relative obedience. As Marsha Pripstein Posusney 
has argued, the “etatism” of the Nasser government “cemented, among 
workers, belief in a moral economy
61
 in which their wages and benefits 
came to be viewed as entitlements in exchange for their contribution to the 
cause of national economic development”.62 The establishment of ETUF 
was coupled with “repressive controls” on the hierarchically structured 
federation. However, as Posusney points out, “this structure was not one 
imposed from above on reluctant unionists. Rather, significant segments of 
the labor movement, including the communist forces who played a key role 
in establishing many of the unions, advocated the singular, centralized 
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structure as the best way for unions to advance workers’ interests”.63 
Therefore, Nasser’s state capitalist reforms initiated a new social contract, 
from which a “moral economy” blossomed that allowed workers to 
ameliorate many of their material conditions in exchange for a level of 
acquiescence. The subjective capacity of working class struggle was not 
entirely eliminated, but it did not present the same level of threat to the 
government’s legitimacy in the immediate post-coup days.  
The situation prevailing during the “Bandung Period” changed 
dramatically by the end of 1958 vis-à-vis three developments. On January 8, 
1958, three weeks before the proclamation of the United Arab Republic,
64
 
all the main currents of the Egyptian communist movement merged to form 
the Communist Party of Egypt, a significant accomplishment for a 
movement marred by internal schism.
65
 Second, a week prior to this merger 
marked the end of the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Conference, held in 
Cairo from December 26, 1957, to January 1, 1958. The communist left was 
at the forefront of this initiative, and their enormous influence threatened the 
regime’s legitimacy vis-à-vis the third world nonaligned movement.66 The 
final, and most important event, was the Iraqi revolution of July, 1958, 
which brought General Abd al-Kareem Qassem to power with the backing 
of the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP). During this period the ICP was one of 
the most influential and best organized parties in Iraq, and far larger than its 
Egyptian counterpart. Qassem represented an alternative to Nasser, and the 
ICP as well as Qassem rejected Nasser’s leadership, instead calling for a 
federal structure that united the Arab nationalists along pluralist lines. Most 
importantly, the ICP refused to liquidate itself as per Nasser’s strict hardline 
requirements to avoid the fate of the Syrian Communist Party under Khaled 
Bakdash.
67
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The second wave of repression: from the New Years’ attack to 
dissolution, 1959-65 
 “In this letter we will try to give you a brief idea of the situation that 
followed the unexpected attack of the 1
st
 of January. Many of our best 
cadres were taken.”68 Thus begins a letter dated May 12, 1959 from Kamal 
Abd al Halim and Muhammad al-Guindi to the group of exiled communists 
in Paris, detailing the renewed attack on the communists in the beginning of 
1959. New Year’s 1959 represented the “surprise attack” by the Nasser 
government in which many of the “best cadres were taken”.69 Nasser had 
utilized his speech at Port Said on December 23, 1958, the anniversary of 
the victory against the tripartite aggressors, to presage this second wave of 
repression a week before it began. According to Nasser a host of “new 
enemies” who purportedly rejected “Arab nationalism and Arab unity” were 
putting forward what “amounts to a call to Zionism to infiltrate itself into 
Arab nationalism, a call to the reactionary elements to return and exploit our 
country”.70  
The second wave of repression began in the early morning hours of 
January 1, 1959. Some 280 shocked communists were arrested, rolling back 
the political advances they had made vis-à-vis unification.
71
 Between 
January and April 1959, some 700 communists were imprisoned, with more 
rounded up throughout the year.
72
 Posusney maintains that throughout 1959 
around 1,000 communists were arrested.
73
 Abd al Halim and al-Guindi 
explain that the “second blow that took place at the end of March was a 
severe blow”.74 One report maintains that as a result of the second wave of 
repression there were “more than 2,000 new prisoners in Egyptian 
concentration camps; plus 1,000 in the Syrian camps”.75  
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The communists bore the brunt of this second wave of repression. 
From 1959 to 1960, at least nine communists died in prison,
76
 including 
prominent communist leader and editor of the communist paper al-Gamahir 
(The Masses), Shuhdi Atiyya al-Shaffi, who was beaten to death in Abu 
Zaabal prison camp, and two prominent textile union leaders, Ali Metwalli 
el-Dib and Sayed Amine.
77
 On March 21, 1959, 153 political prisoners were 
sent from the Citadel to Kharga.
78
 One of them, Dr. Farid Haddad, “the 
doctor to the poor” who served communist patients at his free clinic in a 
working class district, was tortured to death at Kharga after refusing to give 
up patient names and political affiliations.
79
 In October and November of 
1959, two large trials were held against communists: one group of 64 
leaders of the Egyptian Communist Party and another group of 48 leaders 
who had broken away and demanded that communists work inside the 
National Union.
80
 In December of 1960, the repression continued when 
three prominent leftist figures, Abu Seif Yussef, Ismail el-Mahdawi, and 
Ahmed Salem were arrested along with 200 other militants.
81
  
One report maintained that at the end of April there were 1,185 
political prisoners: 400 in the Citadel, 80 in Cairo Women’s Prison, 87 in 
Cairo Central Prison, 168 at Kharga, 350 at Fayoum and Keneh prisons, and 
around 100 at various local police stations.
82
 By July this number had been 
adjusted to 1,230 total prisoners.
83
 Demographic reports of the communists 
under trial during this period appear to confirm Beinin’s argument that 
whereas the communist movement had “significant working class support in 
the period 1952-4,” by the mid-1950s, especially during the period of 
“reconciliation” between 1956-8, “the university-educated intelligentsia was 
the most important component of the movement, especially at the leadership 
level”.84 Of the “trial of 64” defendants only nine (14%) were workers. 
Similarly, in the “trial of 48” less than a dozen were workers. 85 
Furthermore, the trade unions had been reconstructed and reoriented during 
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this time. Trade union leaders loyal to Nasser meant that independent 
working- class activity posed less of a threat during this period than after the 
tumultuous period following the 1952 coup. 
By 1957, the Nasser government was already in the process of 
subduing and coopting the labor movement vis-à-vis the formation of ETUF 
and the beginning of an improvement in their material conditions. Law 91 of 
April 1959 paved the way for the reorganization of the labor movement into 
65 federations along industrial lines and united into a single confederation, a 
number that would later be reduced to 21. Although some right-wing 
elements within the government opposed the confederation model on the 
grounds that centralization would augment labor’s strength, as Posusney 
explains, “the incarceration of the communists weakened the arguments of 
the security forces against consolidation of the confederation”.86 As a result, 
“Egypt’s leftist labor activists, who had first proposed the idea of a 
confederation in the period before the coup… were virtually completely 
excluded from the labor movement when the organization was finally 
formed”.87 Indeed, the 1959 re-imprisonment of the communist working- 
class leadership allowed the state to take full control of the labor movement 
via the Egyptian Trade Union Federation.  
Intractable trade union militants were still desirable targets for the 
Nasser government. One report cites the names of 30 trade union activists in 
prison, including veterans like Ahmed Taha and 51-year old Mohamed Ali 
Amer. Mohammed El Sayed Younes, a textile worker involved in NCWS, 
had been arrested and condemned to prison under Farouk in 1949, was 
released in 1952 and rearrested in August 1953, sentenced to 5 years yet 
again, released in June 1958 and arrested for third time in the January 1959 
round-up.
88
 Some new names appeared on the list, including Mohamed 
Youssef el Medarak, secretary of the hotel and restaurant workers’ 
syndicate, Mohamed Abdel Wahid, secretary of the National Spinners’ 
Syndicate in Alexandria, and Anwar Mahmoud, vice president of the 
Federation of Construction Workers. Textile workers formed the majority of 
those listed: Ahmed Kheidr, Azzab Shatta (Vice President of the Shubra 
union), Abdel Mohsen Hamaoui (Kafr al-Dawwar), and many others.  
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Transport workers, mechanics, hotel and restaurant workers, oil workers, 
and a variety of other trades were listed.
89
 
During this period, the ticket collectors of the Egyptian railways in 
Lower Egypt attempted to strike for better living conditions and higher pay 
and were met with harsh repression. Some two hundred were arrested and 
the leadership was given prison sentences. The union’s president and vice 
president were each given two years in prison, while other executive 
committee members were given anywhere from one- to two-year 
sentences.
90
 Officials from the Union of Arab Workers, such as the non-
communist Fathi Kamil,
91
 were removed from their positions if they did not 
follow directives and openly declare their hostility to communism and the 
communist movement. Similarly, even lawyers who themselves were non-
communist, such as Ahmed Al Badini, a non-leftist nationalist, were 
arrested simply for appearing on the communists’ defense council.92  
This wave of repression lasted until 1964. Throughout March and 
April 1964 all of the communist political prisoners were released from the 
various concentration camps in anticipation of Khruschev’s visit to Egypt.93 
One year later, in 1965, both the United Egyptian Communist Party and the 
DMNL, which had once again split from the UECP, decided to voluntarily 
dissolve themselves and join Nasser’s Arab Socialist Union (ASU) as 
individuals. Thus, by 1965 the communists had been neutralized and their 
influence over the labor movement had been largely eradicated.  
 
Conclusion 
The military government of the Free Officers launched their attack 
against the communists in January of 1953, only months after the strike at 
Kafr al-Dawwar. Within months the government had rounded up hundreds 
of communists. Prior to this wave of repression communist elements, 
particularly the DMNL, had been relatively successful at organizing the 
working class and establishing a working class base, with many workers 
becoming important cadre, through joint nationalist-class initiatives such as 
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the NCWS and the PCGFETU. The somewhat limited demographic 
evidence available on communist prisoners suggests that a significant 
portion, anywhere from one quarter to one third, were working class. Most 
were young, in their twenties, and had some limited organizational 
experience, either in the NCWS, the PCGFETU, the NDF, or simply as 
local trade union militants in Kafr al-Dawwar, Shubra el-Kheima, or 
elsewhere. Likewise, the numbers suggest that the level of repression 
directed at the communists was amplified far beyond what their numbers 
would dictate. Although repression never subsisted entirely from July 1956 
to December 1958, this period did mark a relative easing of repressive 
controls over the communist movement. At the same time, Nasser and the 
Egyptian state instituted various reforms, including improved labor 
conditions the institutionalization of the trade union movement with the 
establishment of the Egyptian Trade Union Federation in 1957. A new 
social contract had been established in which workers envisioned 
themselves in a moral economy where they exchanged their loyalty to the 
Nasserist project for improved material conditions. Beginning in January 
1959, in the wake of communist unification, the growing influence of the 
left, and the Iraqi revolution of 1958, a new wave of repression was 
launched that focused more on communist intellectuals than working class 
cadre. By this period, Nasser had effectively neutralized the communist 
control over the trade union movement and the communists had lost the 
support they had won for themselves in the post-World War II period. 
 
 Dreaming about the lesser evil: revolutionary desire and the 
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n early 2013, growing discontent with the policies of Muslim Brother 
president Muhammad Morsi among political activists, revolutionary youth, 
forces from the old regime and broad layers of the Egyptian population led 
to the mass movement Tamarod (Rebel), which collected millions of 
signatures calling on the president to step down. The campaign gathered 
huge numbers in the streets that rivaled those of the uprising on 25 January 
I 
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2011. However, unlike that episode, the popular movement was 
immediately infiltrated and appropriated by sections of the ruling class and 
state apparatus – especially the military and the Ministry of Interior. 
Tamarod launched the 30 June Front to organize protests against the 
president on the day that commemorated his first year in power. Already on 
28 and 29 June 2013 preparatory demonstrations turned violent when they 
clashed with pro-Morsi supporters. Massive demonstrations and strikes 
mobilizing hundreds of thousands of Egyptians in the streets erupted on 30 
June, demanding nothing less than the resignation of the president. When 
the mass protests entered their second day on 1 July, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, 
head of the Armed Forces, issued an ultimatum to both camps to solve the 
crisis within 48 hours – if not the military would intervene. After two more 
days of deadly clashes between pro and anti-Morsi protesters, the 30 June 
Front met with military leaders, and shortly thereafter the president was 
arrested and removed from his position. In the following period, Muslim 
Brother anti-coup protesters were intimidated, detained, tortured, and killed 
by the security forces. 
Whereas some activists and observers hailed the popularly supported 
military coup as liberation from an incompetent and authoritarian “Islamist” 
rule, others deplored the disposal of Egypt’s “first democratically elected 
president”, which signaled the end of a bumpy yet genuine process of 
democratic transition. They claimed that, although not as smooth a path as 
in Tunisia, the parliamentary and presidential elections of 2011-12 
represented a real movement toward democratization of the Egyptian 
regime. The so-called “Arab Spring” corrected the anomaly that the 
countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region had been left 
out of the “third wave of democracy”,1 which had brought bourgeois 
democracy to formerly authoritarian regimes, ranging from Greece, 
Portugal, and Spain in the 1970s to the Latin America military dictatorships 
in the 1980s and the Eastern Bloc countries in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. Either the MENA nations were latecomers to the “third wave”, or 
they were the forerunners of a “fourth wave”, which would lead remaining 
authoritarian regimes – Iran? China? – into the fold of bourgeois 
democracy. 
Four years after the MENA uprisings, however, the regional process 
of “democratization” appears to have been botched through 
counterrevolutionary coups and interventions (Bahrain, Egypt), civil war 
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(Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yemen), and preemptive transformations from above 
(Algeria, Jordan, Morocco). In Egypt, nationalists, liberals, and a large 
section of the left, especially traditional socialist and communist activists, 
have played a nefarious role in supporting the military as the “lesser evil” 
against the Islamist danger of the Brotherhood. However, Brotherhood 
supporters and a part of the left that has become disillusioned with the 
revolutionary process have also blamed more radical groups such as the 
Revolutionary Socialists (RS) for rejecting both military rule and the 
Brotherhood-led “democratic transition”.2 According to this narrative, the 
RS overestimated the reach of the Egyptian revolution, believing that the 
process could move beyond a mere democratization of state institutions. 
Emphasizing the role of the working class, the self-organization of Tahrir 
and the popular committees, the interpenetration of political and social 
struggles, the persistence of the “deep state” – the military, bureaucratic, 
and security apparatuses at the core of the regime, and the nature of 
Egyptian capitalism, the RS suggested that a transition toward a Western-
style bourgeois democracy was both impossible and undesirable and that 25 
January represented a real opportunity to create an alternative from below.  
With the advantage of hindsight, contemporary skeptics dismiss the 
possibility of such a “permanent revolution”, claiming that representative 
democracy was the horizon of the revolutionary movement and that even 
this modest objective was squandered by gauchist leftists who played into 
the cards of the military apparatus by undermining the process of 
democratic transition that was going on. Yet the narrative that embraces the 
Brotherhood’s “democratic transition” as the lesser evil is based on an 
unsavory cocktail of political naivety and cynicism, which fails to take into 
account crucial elements of the revolutionary process. The four monographs 
that are discussed here have contributed significantly to a more in-depth 
understanding of the limits and possibilities of the revolutionary process.  
Moving beyond the teleological paradigm of “waves of democracy”, 
modeled on a Western ideal type of representative democracy and free-
market capitalism, the 25 January uprising expressed a popular desire for 
change that went far beyond the limits of bourgeois democracy. On the first 
page of the introduction of his aptly named book The People Want, Gilbert 
Achcar stresses that the very slogan of the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings 
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“al-sha’b yurid isqat al-nizam” (“the people want the fall of the regime”) 
expresses the will of the people without intermediaries. The idea of popular 
sovereignty through direct democracy was not restricted to revolutionary 
discourse, but it took concrete form in the practices of organization and 
governance in Tahrir and the popular committees that emerged 
spontaneously throughout the “18 Days” of revolt. Anne Alexander and 
Mostafa Bassiouny rightly refer to Tahrir as the “Republic of Dreams”, 
because popular self-organization allowed ordinary Egyptians to dream 
about much more than representative democracy. As I explain in my own 
book, the occupation of Tahrir Square was not only a weapon against the 
Mubarak regime, but it also projected a new society, which inspired 
movements throughout the whole world. Tahrir was the measure of the 
whole revolutionary process, expressing its hopes, ambitions, and desires. 
The “transition process” that followed the removal of Mubarak from office 
was engineered from above – a counter-revolution in democratic form that 
was completely alien to the vibrant dynamic from below.  
Moreover, the slogan of “bread, freedom, and social justice” chanted 
by the masses indicated that the 25 January uprising represented a high 
point in a struggle for both political and social emancipation. Abdelrahman 
unravels the tangle of political and social movements that preceded the 
insurrection: Egypt’s “long revolution”, which created the networks, 
alliances, and organizational culture that rendered 25 January possible. 
Despite its short length, her book lucidly and concisely shows how, apart 
from democratic campaigns such as Kefaya that mobilized urban middle-
class activists, “workers, farmers and almost everybody else” were drawn 
into protest movements that challenged the repressive security apparatus as 
well as the economic base of the regime. In a reference to Marx, Alexander 
and Bassiouny elaborate on the revolution’s “social soul”, especially the 
independent workers’ movement, which often remained out of the spotlights 
of the mass media, but nevertheless played a crucial role in mobilizing and 
organizing ordinary Egyptians, and paralyzing the state apparatus. 
Alexander’s and Bassiouny’s book offers one of the most complete and 
detailed accounts of the development of the workers’ movement in 
contemporary Egypt. Furthermore, it is written in a lucid language that 
orients itself to an activist audience, avoiding the pitfalls of academic 
jargon. However, like Abdelrahman’s effort, it does not profoundly reflect 
on the theoretical dimensions of the revolutionary process. Alexander and 
Bassiouny are to be commended for deploying a nuanced understanding of 
class, state, and revolution in their study, but it remains unclear how, in 
return, the Egyptian experience may further develop these concepts 
theoretically.  
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All the same, their work demonstrates that before, during, and after 
the “18 Days” the ebb and flow of the struggle from below was determined 
by both a political and a social current. The struggles for democracy and 
social reform are closely intertwined, as Abdelrahman, and Alexander and 
Bassiouny underline, drawing in a similar manner as myself on Rosa 
Luxemburg’s concept of the “mass strike”. Workers, farmers, small 
shopkeepers and other groups who are defending their livelihoods and rights 
are directly confronted with a repressive state apparatus that openly serves 
the interests of specific state and private fractions of capital. In order to 
achieve their demands, the oppressive state has to be confronted and 
dismantled. In this sense, “the economic struggle is political”, as 
Abdelrahman concludes. Equally, democratic movements are faced with the 
issue of class power, which hides behind the domination of the state, and, 
importantly, with the question of forging a broad popular alliance to 
successfully challenge the “deep state”. Without a program of economic 
transformation, democratic movements cannot rally the masses behind their 
project, remaining powerless – as happened with Kefaya in the mid-2000s. 
As Achcar and Hanieh argue, there is a strong correlation between the 
strength of the workers’ movement and the success and failure of the 
MENA uprisings.  
In Tunisia, the left wing within the state union UGTT played a 
leading role in the uprising, which led to the most stable outcome of the 
revolts in the region. In Egypt, fledgling independent trade unions were 
unable to play such a central part, but they still influenced the revolutionary 
process in important ways. In Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain, strong 
workers’ movements were absent, opening up opportunities for ethnic, 
sectarian and tribal actors. The role of workers’ movements is crucial 
because they directly confront the political and social dimensions of 
authoritarian neoliberalism, for example, by demanding affordable public 
services and a national minimum wage, the right to strike and to organize 
themselves freely, etc. 
The interpenetration of the political and the economic struggle 
appears not as a quixotic ultra-leftist demand, but as a strategic necessity 
and logical condition to dismantle the Egyptian dictatorship. First the 
Brotherhood interregnum and then the open return of the military 
dictatorship in the form of al-Sisi’s presidency illustrate the validity of this 
premise, for it is precisely due to the absence of a coalition between 
democratic and social movements that both the old regime and the 
Brotherhood were able to bind fractions of the revolutionary camp to their 
essentially counterrevolutionary projects.  
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Conversely, the idea of a purely democratic transformation of the 
regime on a neoliberal capitalist base is deeply flawed, as both Hanieh and 
Achcar argue from different theoretical angles. Going back to Marx’s 
famous Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy 
Achcar’s point of departure is the MENA’s long history of “fettered 
development”. Unlike authors such as myself, Achcar argues that the 
uprisings were not a local expression of a general crisis of global capitalism 
or of its neoliberal form of appearance, but a regional crisis caused by an 
enduring blockage of development. The success of “developing” nations 
such as Chile, India, and Turkey in neoliberal times illustrates that the 
Egyptian uprising is not a simple effect of neoliberalism. Naturally, 
neoliberal policies have worsened the predicament of the masses in the 
MENA, but these were implemented by states that were already in place. 
For Achcar, the “peculiar modality” of capitalism in the MENA is the 
patrimonial rentier state. Neoliberalism merely added a new layer of 
oppression and exploitation to this historical setup, channeling public 
resources more strongly into the hands of a select group of oligarchs. 
Democratic reform that does not tackle the neoliberal-patrimonial rentier 
state is out of the question. As the Brotherhood leadership is just as much 
involved in rentier activities as the state elites, they could not offer a 
democratic alternative.  
In contradistinction, Hanieh analyzes the Egyptian case from a more 
global perspective, taking into account the internationalization of capital, 
class, and state and, following Lenin, the role of imperialism as a 
geopolitical, military, and economic force. Hanieh rejects the simple binary 
between foreign and domestic capital and points toward the entanglement of 
different fractions of capital. More than Achcar, he stresses the connection 
between global, regional, and national “ebbs and flows of accumulation”. 
Instead of just adding a new layer on top of an existing regime, 
neoliberalism has fundamentally altered the nature of state and class in the 
MENA region. This idea is also developed by Alexander and Bassiouny, 
who highlight changes in the Egyptian working class, caused, for example, 
by the expansion of the privatized and informal sector and the growth of 
smaller units of production. Moreover, Abdelrahman, Alexander and 
Bassiouny, and Hanieh agree that neoliberal accumulation goes hand in 
hand with an increased authoritarianism of the state. The breakdown of the 
“social contract” between state and population leads to a loss of hegemony 
and an increased reliance on violence and coercion – a theme that I 
developed myself. Hanieh concurs with David Harvey that the neoliberal 
project is not about freeing the market from the state, but it exists to 
reinforce capital’s class power through liberating state power from popular 
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control. The notion of a global “third wave of democratization” since the 
1970s becomes much more complicated and ambiguous when cast in the 
light of neoliberal deregulation, globalization, financialization, and debt 
control. As postcolonial states wrestled themselves from the grip of military 
dictators, their new democratic governments found themselves restricted in 
their social and economic policies by the US or supranational institutions 
such as the IMF, which used debt as leverage to enforce local economic 
transformations to the advantage of global finance capital. 
The global dimensions of Egypt’s political and economic crisis that 
led to the 25 January uprising highlights another aspect of “permanent 
revolution”: the Egyptian regime is not merely an ensemble of “national” 
class and state forces, but it is also the playing field of regional, 
international, and transnational actors. Therefore, the popular demand for 
the fall of the regime and the democratization of the state implicitly involves 
a confrontation with Saudi capital, US power, and financial institutions such 
as the IMF. In order to succeed, the revolutionary dynamic of Tahrir had to 
be permanent or uninterrupted, not only in the sense of ceaselessly moving 
from the political to the economic domain and vice versa, but also by 
expanding geographically. The demand for democracy addresses the role of 
the military in Egyptian society, which in turn calls into question US 
support for this authoritarian institution. The demand for welfare (bread and 
social justice) directly challenges not only domestic corruption and “crony” 
capitalism, but also the priorities of IMF-induced austerity programs. In this 
regard Hanieh’s work paints a clear picture of the fundamental 
interconnectedness of domestic, regional, and global relations of power.  
The Tahrir uprising ignited global desires from Occupy in New York 
to the Indignados in Madrid, discontented Greeks in Syntagma Square, the 
Gezi park protests in Istanbul and to mass protests in Brazil. Interestingly 
enough, the “Arab Spring” did not lead to a “fourth wave of 
democratization”, bringing bourgeois democracy to countries such as China 
and Iran, but to protest movements in core countries of neoliberal 
capitalism. The truth is that these nations have suffered – obviously to a 
lesser degree than MENA nations – austerity measures backed up by 
increased state authoritarianism, which threaten both popular sovereignty 
and “the commons”. The global expressions of a desire for change that 
followed the MENA uprisings show that the significance of 25 January 
2011 went beyond a mere democratic revolt. Unfortunately, the authors pay 
insufficient attention to the global impact of the “Arab Spring” and its 
potential long-term historical and political meaning. 
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In conclusion, the story of the Egyptian revolution is much more 
than a bland dream of the lesser evil, a sham-democratic outcome that 
would merely veil the real relations of power. The rude awakening by the 
2013 coup does not discredit the popular desire for societal change 
expressed in Tahrir, but, on the contrary, it shows the inadequacy of the 
limited, uninspiring, compromising, and elite-driven politics conducted by 
Islamist, liberal, nationalist, and socialist leaderships after the fall of 
Mubarak. The failure of the MENA uprisings as domestic and global game 
changers cannot function as proof for a rejection of the logic of “permanent 
revolution”. The reciprocity between and fusion of political and social 
movements and between domestic and global scales is not only an analytical 
possibility and necessity, but also a conscious strategy: a call for 
intervention and a program for action. Hence the work by Alexander and 
Bassiouny is important because instead of making broad generalizations 
about “permanent revolution” or “democratic transition”, it specifically 
deals with the concrete organizational and ideological obstacles that have 
impeded such an “uninterrupted” revolution in Egypt. Their sober analysis 
addresses a central question of our time, which I also touched upon in “A 
Dialectical Pedagogy of Revolt”: how to develop a methodology of political 
intervention that connects the humble state of affairs “on the ground” to the 
grand tasks at hand? If the “Republic of Dreams” has projected an image of 
solidarity, and perhaps even of an alternative society, moving beyond 
capital, class, and the state, how can we develop current forms of 
organization, consciousness, and practice to “get there”? The MENA 
uprisings did not only encourage us to remember to dream or want, but also 
to transcend fundamentally passive theoretical activities such as critique, 
deconstruction, or genealogy, and to construct what Marx called in his 
Theses on Feuerbach revolutionary, practical-critical activity: theory that 
guides revolutionary action, and revolutionary action that is reflected in 
theory. 
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towards explaining what has been described as Tunisia’s particularly 
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structured around the divide between the logics of meritocracy and the 
logics of wealth distribution rather than around the workers/owners divide. 
The origins of the meritocracy/wealth distribution divide can be traced back 
to the socio-historical trajectory of the Jordanian state. Yet, the article 
demonstrates that rather than merely reproducing tensions that shape 
Jordanian society at large, the meritocracy/wealth distribution divide is 
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